Majorities' attitudes towards minorities in Western and Eastern European Societies:

Results from the European Social Survey 2002-2003

Report 4 for the
European Monitoring Centre on
Racism and Xenophobia

Dr. Marcel Coenders
Dr. Marcel Lubbers
Prof. Peer Scheepers

University of Nijmegen
Nijmegen Institute for Social and Cultural Research
Department of Social Science Research Methodology and Sociology

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4.0 Executive summary

Prior to answering our first general question, we performed analyses for empirical evidence on the cross-national comparability of (sets of) items. We decided that only those (sets of) items that can be shown to be comparable across nations can be used to answer our *first general question*, i.e. on the prevalence of different exclusionist stances supported by the populations of several Eastern and Western European societies.

- We discovered resistance to immigrants that prevails among approximately half of the general public.
- We distinguished resistance to asylum seekers that is somewhat less widespread, supported by approximately one out of three people.
- We found resistance to diversity was shared by nearly half of the people living in these European societies.
- A minority of one out of five people indicated that they wish to avoid social interaction with migrants and minorities living in their country, i.e. admitted to their desire to keep them at (ethnic) distance.
- We found a vast majority of approximately two out of three people to be in favour of repatriation policies for migrants who had committed (serious) crimes.

Many of these exclusionist stances are determined by the perception of collective ethnic threat that appeared to be prevalent among somewhat less than two out of three people.

We found large differences between the countries that we took into account. Many of these exclusionist stances turn out to be widely supported by people living in Mediterranean countries among which Greece often comes out on top, just as we found in previous reports. Many of these exclusionist stances are also rather strongly supported by people living in Eastern European societies. People living in Nordic countries appear to disassociate themselves from these exclusionist stances more often, whereas people living in Western European countries often take a position in between.

Next, let us turn to our *second general question*, i.e. on differences between social categories regarding these different exclusionist stances. We would like to emphasise that we found very consistent differences across the distinguished dimensions of exclusionism.

- We generally found that the higher the educational level that people have reached, the less they support exclusionist stances. The lower people's

educational attainment, the more they support exclusionist stances holds for most stances except for resistance to asylum seekers in which case we found that differences between educational categories were quite minor.

- In terms of occupational categories, we found that self-employed people and people performing manual labour support most if not all exclusionist stances considered in this report, followed by people who depend on social security and people running the household.
- People in the lowest income quartile also quite generally support exclusionist stances. Older age categories, those over 50, turn out to support most exclusionist stances. This does not hold for resistance to asylum seekers which is supported somewhat more by younger age categories.
- Most dimensions of exclusionism were supported somewhat more by people living in rural villages or in the countryside.
- With regard to religious attendance, we found that generally people who frequently attend religious services support many instances of exclusionism, more than people who never attend, except for the resistance to asylum seekers in which case the pattern is the other way around: people who never attend show more resistance than people who attend religious services frequently.
- People on the right wing of the political spectrum support different stances of exclusionism quite consistently, also when it comes to asylum seekers.

Considering our *third general question*, the answer can be relatively short:

- We discovered no spurious determinants at the individual level regarding the dimensions of ethnic exclusionism.

Actually, most of the determinants turned out to be rather consistently related to these dimensions, as described in the previous paragraph. The one exception is religious attendance that turned out to be somewhat inconsistently related to the various dimensions of ethnic exclusionism. Yet, we found that the more frequently people attend religious services, the more they resist diversity and the more they favour ethnic distance. Remarkably, we found that gender differences reached significance: some instances of exclusionism turned out to be somewhat more supported by men than by women.

Regarding our *fourth general question*, on the contribution of national conditions to the explanation of ethnic exclusionism, we found that:

- The level of the GDP has consistently negative effects that often reach significance: the higher the GDP, the lower ethnic exclusionism.
- The effects of the presence of non-western non-nationals and net migration are often positive yet do not reach significance for most instances of exclusionism.

The exception is that the higher the proportion of non-western non-nationals in the country or the higher the net migration has been in preceding years, the more people in the country are resistant to diversity. Moreover, net migration also turned out to affect support for repatriation policies. We ascertained some odd effects of the level of unemployment that, however, only rarely reached significance. Effects of the number of asylum applicants turned out to be inconsistent and non-significant. As yet, most of the significant effects of country characteristics appeared to be consistent with our expectations.

Additionally, we would like to emphasise that we found very consistent effects of individual perceptions: the more people perceive decreases in their personal safety or the more they distrust other people or distrust political leaders, or the more they consider themselves to be politically right wing, or the more they perceive ethnic minorities to pose a collective threat, the more they favour ethnic exclusionism. These individual perceptions were actually ascertained to explain, at least partially, the relationships between individual and contextual conditions and exclusionist stances.

4 Majorities' attitudes towards minorities in Eastern and Western European Societies

Just as in previous reports, we started from our conceptual analysis of different stances related to ethnic exclusionism, i.e. different social phenomena indicating that the majority of the country wishes or tries to exclude minorities. We tested a wide range of exclusionist stances for purposes of cross-national comparisons, in those countries for which data are actually available: only those stances for which we found empirical evidence that they were cross-nationally comparable were to be included in the report. Therefore, we once again decided that items that appeared not to be associated with other items related to a certain aspect of ethnic exclusionism or items that turned out to not be valid for a particular set of countries therefore had to be excluded from the report (see the technical details in Appendix 3). Eventually, we ended up with a set of six stances related to ethnic exclusionism, including a total number of 20 items. We used these cross-nationally comparable items to calculate index scores for Europeans living on European soil. Next to the grand means of these scores, we present percentages of Europeans living on European soil who support particular exclusionist stances. Appendix 6 contains more detailed information on the calculation procedures. Let us start with the differences between the aspects of ethnic exclusionism distinguished.

Six 'dimensions' of ethnic exclusionism

Overview 1: grand means and percentages supporting different dimensions of the majority population's attitudes

	mean	*% support*
Resistance to immigrants	.50	50
Resistance to asylum seekers	.44	29
Resistance to diversity	.56	48
Favour ethnic distance	.30	21
Favour repatriation policies for criminal migrants	.70	70
Perceived collective ethnic threat	.56	58

Quite widespread support exists among people living in Eastern and Western societies, amounting to 70% (grand mean=.70) for repatriation policies, support for this stance is therefore actually far more widespread than we ascertained in previous reports. This major difference is due to the 'subjects' of repatriation. In previous measurements included in Eurobarometers, items on the repatriation of legal migrants in any event or in the event they became unemployed, were submitted to the public whereas in European Social Survey

the items refer to migrants who have committed (serious) crimes. Next, we ascertained that nearly half of the samples (48%, grand mean=.56) appear to show their resistance to diversity. Similarly, we found that a majority of the Europeans (amounting to 58%, grand mean=.56) perceive minorities as a collective threat. Resistance to immigrants (grand mean=.50) turns out to be more widespread than resistance to asylum seekers (grand mean=.44). A minority (of 21%, grand mean=.30) is in favour of ethnic distance which implies that they wish to avoid social contacts with migrants.

4.1 Comparisons between societies: descriptive analyses

Let us start with our first question, introduced in Report 1.

4) To what extent does the general public in different countries vary in its support for different dimensions of ethnic exclusionism?

To calculate these differences, we have executed analyses of variance which provide us with the means of the various countries as well as with tests of significance. In Appendix 6 we list the means per country as well as the percentages of people who support these exclusionist stances. Generally, the differences we set out to describe are significant which is, given the number of respondents, to be expected. We present the findings in graphs which are easy to read and allow you to ascertain differences visually.

4.1.1 Resistance to immigrants

We will start out with cross-national differences on the resistance to immigrants. The items refer to resistance to the influx and admittance of immigrants belonging to a different race or ethnic group than the majority population. Moreover, the items also refer to immigrants coming from poor countries from outside Europe and coming from poor countries within Europe. Should immigration policies for these migrants be generous or rather restrictive, is the question that has been posed to numerous Europeans. Let us take a look at the differences between Europeans. Approximately 50% of the public shows resistance to these immigrants.

Figure 1: mean country scores on resistance to immigrants



We find a number of countries in which the resistance to immigrants is far more widespread than in general in these Western and Eastern societies: in Greece and Hungary, the public support this view quite strongly which also holds true but to a somewhat lesser extent for Portugal. In some countries, this type of resistance is somewhat above the grand mean of all the countries together: in Finland, Great Britain, Luxembourg and Austria. Other countries are (well) below the grand mean: like some of the Nordic countries (Sweden), some of Western European countries, (Ireland, and former West Germany), some of the Mediterranean countries (Spain and Italy) as well as one country in Eastern Europe (Poland).

4.1.2 Resistance to asylum seekers

The second aspect we distinguished refers to resistance to asylum seekers. These items all refer to the treatment of asylum seekers that have already entered the country. Should they be given or denied permission to work during the time of the procedure to get legally admitted to the country? Should they be given or denied financial support during this procedure and should they be given the right to reunite with their family once they are legally admitted to the country? Let us take a look at the cross-national differences.

Figure 2: mean country scores on resistance to asylum seekers



We find that in a number of countries resistance to asylum seekers is widespread. This is the case in some Western European countries (such as Great Britain, Belgium and the Netherlands), but also in some Eastern European countries (such as former East-Germany, Hungary and Slovenia). Around the general level of resistance we find countries such as Ireland, former West Germany, some of the Mediterranean countries (Portugal, Italy and Greece) and the Czech Republic. Support for the strict treatment of asylum seekers is far less widespread in the Nordic countries (Finland, Sweden and Denmark), but also in Luxembourg, Spain and Poland.

4.1.3 Resistance to diversity

The previous aspects of ethnic exclusionism were quite different from the dimensions present in the Eurobarometers. However, resistance to diversity has some similarities to the measurements on the 'resistance to multicultural society' in the Eurobarometers. The measurement in European Social Survey as such, however, differs. Here, resistance to diversity comes to the fore in statements on the explicit preference for a monocultural society in which the majority of people share the same customs and traditions and, moreover, in the rejection of a multi-denominational society where everyone can live according to his/her own religious views. This type of resistance is supported by nearly half the general public. Let us take a look at the cross-national differences. As explained in Technical Appendix 3, the mean score in Luxembourg on resistance to diversity is not comparable to the mean scores of other countries.

Figure 3: mean country scores on resistance to diversity



Widespread resistance to diversity is prevalent in some of the Mediterranean countries (Portugal and Greece) but also in some Eastern European countries (Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovenia). Vice versa, it is less widespread in Nordic countries (Finland, Sweden and Denmark) and in many Western European countries (Great Britain, Ireland, the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, Germany and Austria).

4.1.4 Favour ethnic distance

Next, we turn to the avoidance of social interaction with immigrants in society. In Report 1 we briefly described a long and extended tradition of measuring the avoidance of social interaction with migrants in different domains, both public and private. To what extent do Europeans wish to avoid social interaction with migrants belonging to the same or different ethnic groups, who are their superiors at work or with migrants who become members of the family? Approximately 21% of the general public wish to avoid such social interaction. Let us take a look at the cross-national differences.

Figure 4: mean country scores on ethnic distance



Among the countries in which the public favours ethnic distance more than in general, we find some of the Mediterranean countries (Italy and Greece) but also some of the Eastern European countries (the Czech Republic, Slovenia and to a lesser extent Hungary). Vice versa, ethnic distance is somewhat less widespread in some of the Nordic countries (Sweden and Denmark) but also in some of the Western European countries (Luxembourg, Austria and former West-Germany) and in some other Mediterranean countries (Spain and Portugal).

4.1.5 Favour repatriation policies for criminal migrants

In previous reports, we described support for repatriation policies which wish to repatriate all migrants or migrants who become unemployed. Here, in the European Social Survey, support for repatriation refers to repatriation in case of any (serious) crime. Generally, a vast majority of approximately 70% of the public is in favour of repatriation of criminal migrants. To what extent do Europeans differ in the extent to which they feel that such immigrants should be made to leave the country?

Figure 5: mean country scores on being in favour of repatriation policies for criminals



We once again find that support for repatriation policies for criminal migrants is relatively widespread in most of the Mediterranean countries (Portugal, Italy, but particularly in Greece) as well as in Eastern European countries (former East Germany, Poland, but particularly in the Czech Republic and Hungary). In most of the Nordic and West European countries, the support for such repatriation policies for criminal migrants is (far) less widespread.

4.1.6 Perceived collective ethnic threat

Now, let us turn to the perception of collective ethnic threat that we proposed in Report 1 as an explanatory determinant of many exclusionist stances, building on Ethnic Competition Theory. The items present in European Social Survey refer to economic threats as well as cultural threats posed by the presence of immigrants that are perceived by approximately 58% of the general public. Let us have a look at the extent to which the Europeans perceive immigrants to pose a collective threat to the situation in the country.

Figure 6: mean country scores on perceived collective ethnic threat



Particularly in Greece a majority perceives migrants as a threat to society, followed by some of the Eastern European countries (the Czech Republic and Hungary, and somewhat less in former East Germany and Slovenia). This perceived threat is somewhat less prevalent in Western European countries (Luxembourg) and in the Nordic countries.

4.2 Comparisons between social categories: descriptive analyses

Next, we set out to answer our *second general question*:

4) *Which social characteristics among the general public support different dimensions of ethnic exclusionism?*

In order to answer this question, we performed analyses of variance for the differences between social categories. The relationships between social characteristics and dimensions of exclusionism we report have proven to reach significance levels.

4.2.1 Resistance to immigrants

Let us first turn to the resistance to immigrants in society. For reasons of consistency, we will start with differences between educational categories.

Figure 7: resistance to immigrants by education



We find a pattern similar to the ones we already ascertained in previous reports: the higher someone's education, the lower their resistance to immigrants. Categories of people who have not completed primary education or who have the first stage of basic education or who have finished their education at a lower secondary level or in the second stage of basic education generally show more resistance than the people who prolonged their educational career.

Next, let us take a look at the differences between occupational categories. We find that self-employed people, skilled and unskilled manual workers, but also people who have retired or are disabled, and those who work in the household appear to have a somewhat more than average resistance to immigrants. We would like to emphasise that this pattern is quite similar to the pattern we found in the EU member states (Report 2).

Figure 8: resistance to immigrants by occupation



Figure 9: resistance to immigrants by income



When we turn to the differences between household income categories, we also recognise patterns that we have ascertained in previous reports. Particularly people in the lowest income quartile stand out in terms of resistance to immigrants.

Figure 10: resistance to immigrants by age



Let us turn to the differences between age categories. Here, we also find a pattern somewhat similar to the ones we have previously discovered: the older people are, the more resistance they show. Particularly, people in their sixties and seventies show more resistance to migrants.

Figure 11: resistance to immigrants by urbanisation



Regarding urbanisation, we only find minor differences. It turns out that there is somewhat less resistance to immigrants in the suburbs or on the outskirts of big cities and somewhat more in country villages.

Figure 12: resistance to immigrants by religious attendance



There are modest differences in stance between people regarding the extent to which they attend religious services. People who attend frequently or at least once a month show somewhat more resistance than people who never attend.

Figure 13: resistance to immigrants by political orientation



Political orientation also appears to be related to resistance to immigrants. The pattern is that the more right wing people are, the more they resist immigrants.

4.2.2 Resistance to asylum seekers

Next, let us examine the differences for resistance to asylum seekers, beginning with the differences between educational categories. We would like to emphasise that the differences between social categories for this particular exclusionist stance are much more modest than for other exclusionist stances. Let us consider these, rather minor, differences.

Figure 14: resistance to asylum seekers by education



Usually, we find rather big differences between educational categories. Instead, we found minor differences. Particularly, the lower educated do not differ much from the grand mean that we have ascertained in these countries. The mean scores of the higher educated people show the pattern that we have found in previous analyses: they show less resistance to asylum seekers, but not that much less than the general public. Both observations mean that the measure of association between educational attainment and resistance to asylum seekers is half as high (eta=.12) than the association between education and other exclusionist stances (eta's ranging in between .20 and .26).

In terms of occupation we also find quite modest differences. Yet, we found that the occupational categories that generally support exclusionist stances more than average, once again came to the fore: particularly the (skilled and unskilled) manual workers and the unemployed resist to asylum seekers.

Figure 15: resistance to asylum seekers by occupation



Figure 16: resistance to asylum seekers by income



Regarding income categories we also find very modest differences, yet a similar pattern: people in the lowest income quartile support resistance to asylum seekers somewhat more than people in other income categories.

Next, let us consider the differences between age categories. Again, we find minor differences (the association measure is .03) whereas in other cases of exclusionism, we find bigger differences between these age categories (ranging between .09 and .16).

Figure 17: resistance to asylum seekers by age



Younger age categories, that is people under the age of 40, turn out to show a bit more resistance to asylum seekers than people in their forties and fifties, although we have to emphasise that these differences are only minor.

We have to make similar remarks about the (minor) differences regarding urbanisation. People living in small cities and country villages have somewhat more resistance to asylum seekers whereas people living in other areas show somewhat less resistance to asylum seekers.

Figure 18: resistance to asylum seekers by urbanisation



Let us now turn to the differences between people regarding the extent to which they attend religious services. Here we find that people who never attend religious services show somewhat more resistance, whereas people who attend regularly show somewhat less resistance. Remarkably, this pattern is the opposite of the pattern we ascertained regarding resistance to immigrants.

Figure 19: resistance to asylum seekers by religious attendance



Figure 20: resistance to asylum seekers by political orientation



Also, in terms of political orientation we find that the differences between categories are quite modest. We find that those who consider themselves to be in the centre or on the right wing of the political spectrum show somewhat more resistance to asylum seekers whereas those on the left of the political spectrum tend to disassociate themselves somewhat from this point of view.

4.2.3 Resistance to diversity

Let us turn to resistance to diversity, the phenomenon that indicates that people prefer to have a monocultural society and reject a society in which there are many different habits, traditions and denominations.

We will start with differences between educational categories. Here, we ascertain a pattern that we have found before: the higher someone's level of education, the lower their resistance to diversity. People who have attained the level of upper secondary education or a higher level show less resistance to diversity than those who have finished their educational career at a lower level.

Figure 21: resistance to diversity by education



When we take a look at the differences between occupational categories, we (again) find that self-employed people, people performing manual labour, those who depend on social security and people working in the household resist diversity more strongly than people working in more privileged occupations.

Figure 22: resistance to diversity by occupation



Differences between income categories are far more modest, but the pattern is similar to those ascertained previously: people in the lowest quartile show more resistance than people in the highest quartile.

Figure 23: resistance to diversity by income



Let us turn to the differences between age categories. There are only minor differences between people under the age of fifty: they all show somewhat less resistance to diversity than people in their sixties and seventies.

Figure 24: resistance to diversity by age



When we turn to residential categories, we again find minor differences. People living in country villages turn out to resist a bit more to diversity in society than the general public.

Figure 25: resistance to diversity by urbanisation



Next, we consider the differences between categories of people who differ in their religious attendance. We find that the people who attend frequently or monthly show more resistance to diversity than people who rarely or never attend.

Figure 26: resistance to diversity by religious attendance



Figure 27: resistance to diversity by political orientation



Again, we find that those who consider themselves to be on the right wing of the political spectrum show more resistance to diversity than those on the left wing.

4.2.4 Favour ethnic distance

Next, we turn to ethnic distance, i.e. the wish to avoid social interaction with migrants in different public and private domains. Regarding educational attainment, we ascertain a pattern that we have found in many previous analyses: the higher someone's educational level, the less they favour ethnic distance to migrants. Actually, among people who have not completed primary education ethnic distance is twice as high (mean=.4) as among people who have finished the second stage of tertiary education (mean=.2).

Figure 28: favour ethnic distance by education



In terms of occupational categories, we (again) find a similar pattern: the self-employed and those who depend on social security favour ethnic distance somewhat more, followed by (skilled and unskilled) manual labourers and people working in the household.

Figure 29: favour ethnic distance by occupation



Figure 30: favour ethnic distance by income



We find that people in the lowest income quartile support this particular exclusionist stance somewhat more than people in the highest income quartile.

Next, we turn to differences between age categories. We once again ascertained a pattern similar to those previously described: the older people are, the more they favour ethnic distance. Age 50 and up, people tend to favour ethnic distance more than the general public.

Figure 31: favour ethnic distance by age



When we turn to urbanisation, we find that people living in country villages or in the countryside favour ethnic distance more than people living in (the suburbs of) big cities.

Figure 32: favour ethnic distance by urbanisation



Next we looked at people and their attendance at religious services. We again found that people who attend frequently or monthly, favour ethnic distance more than those who never attend religious services.

Figure 33: favour ethnic distance by religious attendance



In terms of political orientation, we found a similar pattern to the ones described above: the more right wing people favour ethnic distance more than those on the left wing, whereas the people who consider themselves politically in the centre exactly in the middle, i.e. on the European average.

Figure 34: favour ethnic distance by political orientation



4.2.5 Favour repatriation policies for criminal migrants

Now, let us turn to repatriation policies for immigrants who have committed serious criminal offences. We have already ascertained that a majority of the general public wishes these migrants to leave the country.

Differences between educational categories are, again, rather consistent. The higher someone's educational level, the less they favour repatriation policies. People who have finished upper secondary level education are exactly in between: people with lower educational attainments support this type of repatriation policy more, whereas people with higher attainments support this policy less.

Figure 35: favour repatriation policies for criminal migrants by education



Strikingly consistent are the findings in terms of differences between occupational categories: the self-employed stand out to favour this type of repatriation policy together with the people who depend on social security, followed by manual labourers and people working in the household.

Figure 36: favour repatriation policies for criminal migrants by occupation



In terms of income differences, another strikingly consistent pattern emerges: people in the lowest income quartile favour repatriation more than those with higher incomes.

Figure 37: favour repatriation policies for criminal immigrants by income



Next, we turn to differences between age categories. Again we found, a similar pattern with the people in their fifties exactly in between the other age categories: the younger ones favour this type of policy less, whereas the older ones favour this policy more.

Figure 38: favour repatriation policies for criminal migrants by age



Then, we turn to differences between categories of urbanisation, which are quite minor. We find somewhat less support for this type of policy among the people living in the suburbs and those living in the countryside and somewhat more support among those living in the country villages.

Figure 39: favour repatriation policies for criminal migrants by urbanisation



Next, we turn to (minor) differences between people who go to religious services. We found that people who attend frequently or monthly favour repatriation policies for these (criminal) migrants more than those who never attend.

Figure 40: favour repatriation policies for criminal migrants by religious attendance



In terms of political orientation, we find the similar pattern: those on the far right support these repatriation policies more than those on the left wing. Moreover, a pattern that was already visible in previous diagrams is now more distinct: people on the far left do not differ from people in the middle of the political spectrum.

Figure 41: favour repatriation policies for criminal migrants by political orientation



4.2.6 Perceived collective ethnic threat

Next, let us consider the perception of collective ethnic threat, i.e. the view that migrants and minorities pose an economic and cultural threat to the majority that we have proposed to be to some extent responsible for many exclusionist stances.

Again, we find the pattern that we ascertained previously in a number of instances: the lower someone's educational attainment, the stronger they perceive migrants as a collective threat, with the people who finished upper secondary level education exactly in the middle.

Figure 42: perceived collective ethnic threat by education



The same occupational categories that we mentioned regarding previous exclusionist stances stand out when it comes to the perception of collective ethnic threat which also holds true for the income categories.

Figure 43: perceived collective ethnic threat by occupation



Figure 44: perceived collective ethnic threat by income



When we turn to the differences between age categories, we again find a similar pattern to that found before with the people in their fifties exactly in the middle: those who have not yet reached this age (category) turn out to perceive migrants somewhat less as a collective threat whereas those who have passed this age (category) perceive migrants as more of a collective threat.

Figure 45: perceived collective ethnic threat by age



Next, we turn to the minor differences between people living in cities and small villages. We find that the people living in country villages perceive migrants more as a collective threat than other people.

Figure 46: perceived collective ethnic threat by urbanisation



We find that people who attend religious services frequently experience (slightly) more of a collective threat from the presence of migrants than those who never attend religious services.

Figure 47: perceived collective ethnic threat by religious attendance



Figure 48: perceived collective ethnic threat by political orientation



People on the right wing of the political spectrum perceive more of a collective ethnic threat than people on the left. Again we find that the people on the far left do not differ so much from the people in the middle of the political spectrum.

4.3 Comparisons between states and social categories: multivariate multi-level analyses

The following paragraphs of this report will be devoted to answering our third and fourth general questions:

4) Which social characteristics are spuriously related to (different dimensions of) ethnic exclusionism?
4) To what extent do particular national characteristics affect (dimensions of) ethnic exclusionism?

For this purpose, we performed multivariate multi-level analyses on each of the dimensions of ethnic exclusionism, just like in previous reports.

There is, however, a major difference with the previous reports: that is the inclusion of so-called intermediate characteristics on individual perceptions (see Table 1b which lists intermediate characteristics such as 'social distrust' and 'political distrust').

These perceptions are theoretically considered, building on Ethnic Competition Theory, to provide interpretations or explanations for the relationships between individual conditions (like educational attainment and occupation), on the one hand, and the dimensions of ethnic exclusionism, on the other. These intermediate characteristics will be added to the models to explain ethnic exclusionism, after the individual and national conditions have been taken into account to explain their relationship with the various dimensions of ethnic exclusionism. We follow the same procedure as elaborated somewhat more extensively in Report 2.

4.3.1 Resistance to immigrants

This attitude turned out to be held by approximately half the general public. Comparing Model 1 to Model 0 in Table 1a tells us that there are strong and significant differences between the countries under consideration. A comparison of Model 2 to Model 1 in Table 1a shows that there are also significant differences between social categories. However, adding Model 3 country characteristics to the characteristics included in Model 2 does not significantly improve the fit of the model. Yet taking into account the intermediate characteristics does improve the fit of the model, even more strongly than previous

determinants related to individual and national conditions did, as shown by the decrease in the log-likelihood of the model.

Table 1a. Different multi-level models on resistance to immigrants (*=significant improvement of model fit)

Models		*-2*loglikelihood*	*Δ-2*loglikelihood*	*Δdf*
0	Intercept (Individual level variation)	153.403		
1	+ random variation at country level	149.102	4.301*	1
2	+individual characteristics	142.910	6.192*	21
3	+country characteristics	142.904	6	5
4	+intermediate characteristics	131.041	11.863*	5

The parameters of Model 2 in Table 1b show that the effect of educational attainment reaches significance: the higher someone's level of education, the less they resist immigrants. Differences between occupational categories when compared to the reference category, i.e. higher professionals, also reach significance. We find that people performing manual work, those dependent on social security or those running a household and the self-employed resist immigrants more strongly than higher professionals do. Worth mentioning is the finding that routine non-manuals also differ significantly from the latter category. The effect of income is negative: the lower someone's household income, the more they resist immigrants. In terms of urbanisation, we find that people living in more urbanised parts of the country resist immigrants less strongly than people living in the countryside. Resistance to immigrants prevails more strongly among the elderly. We find no significant differences between categories of religious service attendance and gender.

Regarding the effects of country characteristics, presented in Model 3, we find that the effect of the GDP reaches significance: the higher the country's GDP, the lower the resistance to immigrants. The effect of unemployment is significant too, but in a direction which is at odds with our hypotheses: the higher the country's unemployment level, the lower the resistance to immigrants. The other country characteristics do not reach significance. We would like to mention though, that the effects of the presence of non-national non-westerners as well as the effect of net migration are in the direction that we proposed whereas the effect of asylum applications is in the opposite direction to that described in our hypotheses.

Inclusion of the intermediate characteristics in Model 4 does contribute quite strongly to the explained variance at individual as well as at contextual level. We find that all of the intermediate determinants contribute to resistance to immigrants: the more someone's political orientation is on the right wing of the political spectrum, the more they perceive that they are unsafe, the more they distrust other people, the more they distrust political

leaders and the more they perceive allochthonous people to be a collective threat and the more they show resistance to immigrants.

Table1b. Parameter estimates from multi-level models on resistance to immigrants standard errors in brackets (N=30915)

	Model 1	*Model 2*	*Model 3*	*Model 4*
Intercept	**0.50 (0.02)**	**0.50 (0.02)**	**0.50 (0.02)**	**0.50 (0.02)**
Individual characteristics				
Education (in years)		**-1.11^{-2} (0.00)**	**-1.11^{-2} (0.00)**	**-0.46^{-2} (0.00)**
Occupation: (higher prof. = ref.)				
Lower professionals		-0.00 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)
Routine non-manuals		**0.02 (0.01)**	**0.02 (0.01)**	0.01 (0.01)
Self-employed people		**0.04 (0.01)**	**0.04 (0.01)**	**0.02 (0.01)**
Skilled manuals		**0.05 (0.01)**	**0.05 (0.01)**	**0.02 (0.01)**
Unskilled manuals		**0.04 (0.01)**	**0.04 (0.01)**	**0.02 (0.01)**
Students		**-0.04 (0.01)**	**-0.04 (0.01)**	**-0.02 (0.01)**
Unemployed people		**0.04 (0.01)**	**0.04 (0.01)**	0.01 (0.01)
Retired people		**0.04 (0.02)**	**0.04 (0.02)**	**0.02 (0.01)**
Housewives		**0.04 (0.02)**	**0.04 (0.02)**	0.01 (0.01)
Others. not working		0.00 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)
Income		**-9.96^{-3} (0.00)**	**-9.97^{-3} (0.00)**	**-4.82^{-3} (0.00)**
Age		**6.95^{-4} (0.00)**	**6.95^{-4} (0.00)**	**9.31^{-4} (0.00)**
Gender: Male (female = ref.)		0.01 (0.00)	0.01 (0.00)	**0.01 (0.00)**
Urbanisation: (countryside = ref.)				
Country village		-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)
Town or small city		-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)
Suburbs or outskirts of big city		**-0.02 (0.01)**	**-0.02 (0.01)**	-0.01 (0.01)
Big city		**-0.03 (0.00)**	**-0.03 (0.00)**	-0.00 (0.00)
Church attendance: (never = ref.)				
Attendance once a week		-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)
Attendance once a month		-0.00 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)
Attendance rarely		0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.00)
Country characteristics				
Unemployment: 2002			**-8.12^{-3} (0.00)**	-5.85^{-3} (0.00)
GDP: 2002			**-9.65^{-3} (0.00)**	-1.01^{-3} (0.00)
Non-western non-nationals: 2000			7.11^{-3} (0.01)	4.14^{-3} (0.01)
Net migration: 1995-2000			0.02 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)
Asylum applications: 2001-2			-0.02 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.01)
Intermediate characteristics				
Left-right placement				**9.17^{-3} (0.00)**
Perceived unsafety				**7.08^{-3} (0.00)**
Social distrust				**6.05^{-3} (0.00)**
Political distrust				**5.50^{-3} (0.00)**
Perceived ethnic threat				**0.68 (0.03)**
Variance components				
Individual	0.057	0.053	0.053	0.040
(Percentage explained)		(7.96)	(7.96)	(29.51)
Country	0.007	0.006	0.005	0.003
(Percentage explained)		(11.34)	(36.14)	(57.48)

Note: bold parameters indicate significance at $p < 0.05$, italic parameters indicate significance at $p < 0.10$.

When we compare the parameters of Models 3 and 4, Model 4 reveals that these intermediate characteristics reduce the effects previously ascertained in Model 3 of educational attainment and income. Moreover, the intermediate characteristics reduce differences between occupational and residential categories; some differences like the one between unemployed people and higher professionals are even reduced to non-significance (compare these parameters in Model 3 and 4). We also found that the effects of the GDP and unemployment were reduced to insignificance (cf. Models 3 and 4). The latter findings all imply that these intermediate characteristics actually explain, at least to some extent, why people in non-privileged positions (in terms of education, occupation and income) or people in the countryside resist relatively strongly to immigrants: it is (partially) due to distrust and perceptions of unsafety and particularly due to the perception of collective ethnic threat that stands out as the most important determinant of this type of resistance[1].

4.3.2 Resistance to asylum seekers

Turning to Table 2a with the different multi-level models to explain resistance to asylum seekers, which turned out to be far less widely spread than resistance to immigrants, we present a picture that strongly resembles the models on resistance to immigrants. Differences between countries are significant as well as differences between social categories. However, adding country characteristics does not contribute significantly to the explanation. Adding intermediate characteristics turns out to be very important in terms of model fit.

Table2a. Different multi-level models on resistance to asylum seekers (*=significant improvement of model fit)

Models	*-2*loglikelihood*	*Δ-2*loglikelihood*	*Δdf*
0 Intercept (Individual level variation)	135.836		
1 + random variation at country level	132.864	2.972*	1
2 +individual characteristics	128.876	3.988*	21
3 +country characteristics	128.872	4	5
4 +intermediate characteristics	119.695	9.177*	5

In Model 2 of Table 2b we find that the effect of educational attainment is, again, negative. We find similar, although less pronounced differences between occupational categories: people performing manual labour resist more strongly, but so do retired people and the self-employed too. The negative effect of income again reaches significance: the lower someone's income, the more they resist asylum seekers. The older someone is, the more resistance they show to asylum seekers. The finding that males resist asylum seekers more strongly than females is worth mentioning. People living in the (suburbs of) big cities appear to resist asylum seekers less strongly than people residing in the countryside. We find no differences between people who attend religious services and people who never attend.

Model 3 of Table 2b shows that none of the effects of contextual characteristics reach significance. Yet, we would like to mention that the effect of the GDP and that related to the influx and presence of minorities are in the direction we proposed which does not hold for the effect of unemployment.

Turning to the effects of the intermediate characteristics in Model 4, we again find that these are all in the direction we proposed: the more right wing someone is, the more they distrust other people or political leaders, the more they perceive themselves as being unsafe or more specifically threatened by the presence of allochthonous people and consequently the more they resist asylum seekers. Inclusion of these determinants in the model increases the explained variances at both levels. Moreover, these determinants reduce the effects of educational attainment and income, and reduce differences between all occupational and residential categories to non-significance, implying that the previously ascertained differences between these categories are (partially) due to these intermediate characteristics.

Table 2b. Parameter estimates from multi-level models on resistance to asylum seekers; standard errors in brackets (N=30915)

	Model 1	*Model 2*	*Model 3*	*Model 4*
Intercept	**0.44 (0.01)**	**0.44 (0.02)**	**0.44 (0.01)**	**0.44 (0.01)**
Individual characteristics				
Education (in years)		**-0.59^{-2} (0.00)**	**-0.59^{-2} (0.00)**	**-0.15^{-2} (0.00)**
Occupation: (higher prof. = ref.)				
Lower professionals		-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)
Routine non-manuals		0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.00 (0.00)
Self-employed people		*0.02 (0.01)*	*0.02 (0.01)*	-0.00 (0.01)
Skilled manuals		**0.03 (0.01)**	**0.03 (0.01)**	**0.01 (0.01)**
Unskilled manuals		**0.02 (0.01)**	**0.02 (0.01)**	0.00 (0.00)
Students		**-0.02 (0.01)**	**-0.02 (0.01)**	-0.01 (0.01)
Unemployed people		0.02 (0.01)	0.02 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)
Retired people		**0.02 (0.01)**	**0.02 (0.01)**	-0.00 (0.00)
Housewives		0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.00)
Others. not working		0.00 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)
Income		**-5.27^{-3} (0.00)**	**-5.27^{-3} (0.00)**	-1.19^{-3} (0.00)
Age		**8.07^{-4} (0.00)**	**8.06^{-4} (0.00)**	**7.17^{-4} (0.00)**
Gender: Male (female = ref.)		**0.01 (0.00)**	**0.01 (0.00)**	**0.01 (0.00)**
Urbanisation: (countryside = ref.)				
Country village		-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	0.00 (0.00)
Town or small city		*-0.01 (0.01)*	*-0.01 (0.01)*	-0.00 (0.00)
Suburbs or outskirts of big city		**-0.01 (0.01)**	**-0.01 (0.01)**	-0.00 (0.00)
Big city		**-0.02 (0.01)**	**-0.02 (0.01)**	-0.00 (0.00)
Church attendance: (never = ref.)				
Attendance once a week		-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.00)
Attendance once a month		-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.00)
Attendance rarely		-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)
Country characteristics				
Unemployment: 2002			-0.59^{-3} (0.00)	0.43^{-3} (0.00)
GDP: 2002			-3.95^{-3} (0.00)	1.92^{-3} (0.00)
Non-western non-nationals: 2000			0.29^{-3} (0.01)	-1.73^{-3} (0.01)
Net migration: 1995-2000			0.00 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)
Asylum applications: 2001-2			0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)
Intermediate characteristics				
Left-right placement				**6.10^{-3} (0.00)**
Perceived unsafety				**4.00^{-3} (0.00)**
Social distrust				**3.90^{-3} (0.00)**
Political distrust				**4.53^{-3} (0.00)**
Perceived ethnic threat				**0.47 (0.03)**
Variance components				
Individual	0.035	0.034	0.034	0.028
(Percentage explained)		(2.38)	(2.38)	(19.38)
Country	0.004	0.004	0.003	0.002
(Percentage explained)		(0.00)	(14.25)	(45.24)

Note: bold parameters indicate significance at p < 0.01, italic parameters indicate significance at p < 0.10.

4.3.3 Resistance to diversity

Now, let us consider the multi-level models on resistance to diversity, a view shared by half of the samples under consideration. Quite a different picture emerges from Table 3a, particularly for the contribution of the country characteristics to the explanation that, judging from the improvement of the fit, appears to be worthwhile. This table also shows that the differences between countries and categories are significant which also holds true for the intermediate characteristics that again appear to be quite important.

Table 3a. Different multi-level models on resistance to diversity (*=significant improvement of model fit)

Models		*-2*loglikelihood*	*Δ-2*loglikelihood*	*Δdf*
0	Intercept (Individual level variation)	143.505		
1	+ random variation at country level	139.980	3.525*	1
2	+individual characteristics	134.009	5.971*	21
3	+country characteristics	133.985	24*	5
4	+intermediate characteristics	125.738	8.247*	5

Table 3b, Model 2, then, again shows that the higher someone's educational attainment, the less they resist diversity. Differences between occupational categories remain significant: people performing manual work, people who depend on social security or who run a household as well as self-employed people stand out.

Table 3b. Parameter estimates from multi-level models on resistance to diversity; standard errors in brackets (N=30915)

	Model 1	*Model 2*	*Model 3*	*Model 4*
Intercept	**0.55 (0.02)**	**0.51 (0.02)**	**0.51 (0.01)**	**0.52 (0.01)**
Individual characteristics				
Education (in years)		**-0.93^{-2} (0.00)**	**-0.93^{-2} (0.00)**	**-0.50^{-2} (0.00)**
Occupation: (higher prof. = ref.)				
Lower professionals		0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)
Routine non-manuals		**0.03 (0.01)**	**0.03 (0.01)**	**0.03 (0.01)**
Self-employed people		**0.05 (0.01)**	**0.05 (0.01)**	**0.04 (0.01)**
Skilled manuals		**0.05 (0.01)**	**0.05 (0.01)**	**0.03 (0.01)**
Unskilled manuals		**0.04 (0.01)**	**0.04 (0.01)**	**0.03 (0.01)**
Students		**0.02 (0.01)**	**0.02 (0.01)**	**0.03 (0.01)**
Unemployed people		**0.05 (0.01)**	**0.05 (0.01)**	**0.03 (0.01)**
Retired people		**0.06 (0.01)**	**0.06 (0.01)**	**0.04 (0.01)**
Housewives		**0.04 (0.01)**	**0.04 (0.01)**	**0.03 (0.01)**
Others, not working		**0.03 (0.01)**	**0.03 (0.01)**	**0.03 (0.01)**
Income		**-3.66^{-3} (0.00)**	**-3.68^{-3} (0.00)**	-1.07^{-3} (0.00)
Age		**5.94^{-4} (0.00)**	**5.93^{-4} (0.00)**	**7.18^{-4} (0.00)**
Gender: Male (female = ref.)		**0.02 (0.00)**	**0.02 (0.00)**	**0.02 (0.00)**
Urbanisation: (countryside = ref.)				
Country village		-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.00)
Town or small city		**-0.02 (0.01)**	**-0.02 (0.01)**	-0.01 (0.00)
Suburbs or outskirts of big city		**-0.03 (0.01)**	**-0.03 (0.01)**	**-0.02 (0.01)**
Big city		**-0.04 (0.01)**	**-0.04 (0.01)**	**-0.02 (0.01)**
Church attendance: (never = ref.)				
Attendance once a week		**0.04 (0.01)**	**0.04 (0.00)**	**0.04 (0.00)**
Attendance once a month		**0.02 (0.01)**	**0.02 (0.00)**	**0.02 (0.00)**
Attendance rarely		0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.00)	0.01 (0.00)
Country characteristics				
Unemployment: 2002			-0.94^{-3} (0.00)	-0.97^{-3} (0.00)
GDP: 2002			**-1.01^{-2} (0.00)**	**-4.49^{-3} (0.00)**
Non-western non-nationals: 2000			**7.35^{-3} (0.01)**	*5.30^{-3} (0.01)*
Net migration: 1995-2000			**0.02 (0.01)**	0.01 (0.01)
Asylum applications: 2001-2			-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)
Intermediate characteristics				
Left-right placement				**9.19^{-3} (0.00)**
Perceived unsafety				**3.13^{-3} (0.00)**
Social distrust				**1.96^{-3} (0.00)**
Political distrust				0.87^{-3} (0.00)
Perceived ethnic threat				**0.49 (0.04)**
Variance components				
Individual	0.044	0.040	0.040	0.034
(Percentage explained)		(7.77)	(7.77)	(21.63)
Country	0.005	0.003	0.001	0.001
(Percentage explained)		(30.96)	(81.62)	(71.68)

Note: bold parameters indicate significance at p < 0.01, italic parameters indicate significance at p < 0.10.

Rather remarkable is the finding that resistance to diversity is also more strongly supported by routine non-manuals and students, in comparison to higher professionals. The latter finding is the more remarkable since students in general disassociate themselves from most exclusionist stances. The effect of income is negative and the effect of age is positive. Nearly all residential categories resist less strongly to diversity than the people living in the countryside. In terms of religiosity, we find a rather straightforward linear effect: the more frequently people attend religious services, the more strongly they resist diversity, This effect is quite dissimilar to the effects we previously ascertained, yet plausible since this measurement also refers to different religions.

Next, we turn to the effects of the country characteristics in Model 3. We find that the higher the GDP of the country is, the lower the resistance to diversity. The presence and influx of immigrants appears to increase resistance to diversity as indicated by the parameters accompanying the proportion of non-western non-nationals and the net migration in previous years. However, the effect of asylum applications does not reach significance which also holds true for the negative effect of unemployment.
Inclusion of the intermediate characteristics in Model 4 once again increases the proportions of explained variance and reduces some of the effects of individual characteristics. Moreover these intermediate characteristics reduce the previously ascertained effects of country characteristics. Each of the intermediate characteristics reaches significance, except for political distrust. A comparison of the parameters in Model 3 to Model 4 shows that the effects of the GDP and non-western non-nationals decrease whereas the effects of net migration are reduced to non-significance which implies that these effects are intervened by political orientations, perceptions of unsafety, social distrust and particularly perceptions of collective ethnic threat which has, again, the strongest effect.

4.3.4 Favour ethnic distance

Next, we consider the phenomenon of avoiding social contact with allochthonous citizens, subscribed to by a minority of the samples under study. The different multi-level models suggest a picture similar to that we ascertained regarding resistance to immigrants and asylum seekers. Differences between countries and social categories are rather strong and significant but the contribution of country characteristics is quite minor and non-significant as indicated by a comparison of Model 3 and 4.

Table 4a. Different multi-level models on in favour of ethnic distance (*=significant improvement of model fit)

Models		*-2*loglikelihood*	*Δ-2*loglikelihood*	*Δdf*
0	Intercept (Individual level variation)	157.467		
1	+ random variation at country level	155.605	1.862*	1
2	+individual characteristics	149.761	5.844*	21
3	+country characteristics	149.758	3	5
4	+intermediate characteristics	141.948	7.810*	5

Then again, the contribution of the intermediate characteristics turns out to be major. Let us have a look at the parameter estimates.

Model 2 of Table 4b shows again that educational attainment has a negative effect: the longer someone's education, the less they favour ethnic distance. Differences between occupational categories are similar to differences we have already ascertained: people performing manual work and unemployed people stand out followed by people not involved in the labour market (such as retired people, people running a household and others who do not work) but also by self-employed people. Again, routine non-manuals appear to differ from the reference category which does not hold for lower professionals and students who take a view similar to higher professionals. The effect of income does not reach significance. The older people are, the more they favour ethnic distance. Males favour ethnic distance more than females. Nearly all residential categories favour ethnic distance less than the people living in the countryside. All categories of people who attend religious services favour ethnic distance more than people who never attend religious services.

Including the effects of country characteristics in Model 3 appears to be in vain: none of the country characteristics appear to reach significance. Yet, we recognise that the effects of the GDP, net migration and asylum applications are in the direction we proposed which does not hold true for the level of unemployment and the presence of non-western non-nationals.

Inclusion, in Model 4, of the effects of the intermediate characteristics strongly increases the explained variance at both levels. However, the effects of social and political distrust do not appear to reach significance. The other intermediate characteristics are significant in the direction we proposed, but they hardly reduce the previously ascertained effects of individual characteristics, except for education and some of the differences between occupational categories.

Table 4b. Parameter estimates from multi-level models on in favour of ethnic distance; standard errors in brackets (N=30915)

	Model 1	*Model 2*	*Model 3*	*Model 4*
Intercept	**0.30 (0.01)**	**0.27 (0.01)**	**0.26 (0.01)**	**0.27 (0.01)**
Individual characteristics				
Education (in years)		**-1.00^{-2} (0.00)**	**-1.00^{-2} (0.00)**	**-0.53^{-2} (0.00)**
Occupation: (higher prof. = ref.)				
Lower professionals		0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)
Routine non-manuals		**0.03 (0.01)**	**0.03 (0.01)**	**0.03 (0.01)**
Self-employed people		**0.05 (0.01)**	**0.05 (0.01)**	**0.03 (0.01)**
Skilled manuals		**0.05 (0.01)**	**0.05 (0.01)**	**0.03 (0.01)**
Unskilled manuals		**0.05 (0.01)**	**0.05 (0.01)**	**0.03 (0.01)**
Students		0.00 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)	0.02 (0.01)
Unemployed people		**0.07 (0.01)**	**0.07 (0.01)**	**0.04 (0.01)**
Retired people		**0.04 (0.01)**	**0.04 (0.01)**	**0.02 (0.01)**
Housewives		**0.04 (0.01)**	**0.04 (0.01)**	**0.02 (0.01)**
Others, not working		**0.05 (0.01)**	**0.05 (0.01)**	**0.04 (0.01)**
Income		-1.53^{-3} (0.00)	-1.57^{-3} (0.00)	1.73^{-3} (0.00)
Age		**1.16^{-3} (0.00)**	**1.16^{-3} (0.00)**	**1.17^{-3} (0.00)**
Gender: Male (female = ref.)		**0.01 (0.00)**	**0.01 (0.00)**	**0.02 (0.00)**
Urbanisation: (countryside = ref.)				
Country village		**-0.02 (0.01)**	**-0.02 (0.01)**	*-0.01 (0.00)*
Town or small city		**-0.03 (0.01)**	**-0.03 (0.01)**	**-0.02 (0.00)**
Suburbs or outskirts of big city		**-0.03 (0.01)**	**-0.03 (0.01)**	**-0.03 (0.01)**
Big city		**-0.04 (0.01)**	**-0.04 (0.01)**	**-0.03 (0.01)**
Church attendance: (never = ref.)				
Attendance once a week		**0.05 (0.01)**	**0.05 (0.01)**	**0.04 (0.01)**
Attendance once a month		**0.03 (0.01)**	**0.03 (0.01)**	**0.02 (0.00)**
Attendance rarely		**0.02 (0.00)**	**0.02 (0.00)**	**0.01 (0.00)**
Country characteristics				
Unemployment: 2002			-0.55^{-3} (0.00)	0.93^{-3} (0.00)
GDP: 2002			-5.31^{-3} (0.00)	0.78^{-3} (0.00)
Non-western non-nationals: 2000			-2.64^{-3} (0.01)	-4.46^{-3} (0.01)
Net migration: 1995-2000			0.01 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)
Asylum applications: 2001-2			0.00 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)
Intermediate characteristics				
Left-right placement				**9.16^{-3} (0.00)**
Perceived unsafety				**1.78^{-2} (0.00)**
Social distrust				0.67^{-3} (0.00)
Political distrust				0.45^{-3} (0.00)
Perceived ethnic threat				**0.57 (0.03)**
Variance components				
Individual	0.070	0.066	0.066	0.058
(Percentage explained)		(5.11)	(5.11)	(17.16)
Country	0.004	0.003	0.003	0.001
(Percentage explained)		(20.74)	(39.26)	(69.05)

Note: bold parameters indicate significance at $p < 0.01$, italic parameters indicate significance at $p < 0.10$.

4.3.5 Favour repatriation policies for criminal immigrants

Now, we turn to the fifth dimension of ethnic exclusionism in this report, the view that criminal immigrants should be made to leave, favoured by a vast majority of the samples. The results in Table 5a for the multi-level Models 1 and 2 tell us that there are significant differences between countries and social categories. Moreover, adding country characteristics (Model 3) appears to contribute to the fit of the model as does the inclusion of the intermediate characteristics in Model 4.

Table 5a. Different multi-level models on in favour of repatriation policies (*=significant improvement of model fit)

Models		*-2*loglikelihood*	*Δ-2*loglikelihood*	*Δdf*
0	Intercept (Individual level variation)	151.858		
1	+ random variation at country level	147.624	4.234*	1
2	+individual characteristics	141.679	5.945*	21
3	+country characteristics	141.662	17*	5
4	+intermediate characteristics	133.964	7.698*	5

Table 5b, Model 2, shows again a negative effect for educational attainment. Typically, similar occupational categories stand to favour repatriation policies for criminal immigrants: people performing manual work and people outside of the labour market. Again we find that self-employed people and routine non-manuals favour these policies. Remarkably, also lower professionals stand out as being in favour of these policies. which we have not found in previous instances. The negative effect for income reaches significance. The older someone is, the stronger they favour these policies. Males appear to be less in favour of repatriation policies than females are. All residential categories favour these policies less than the people living in the countryside. Among people who attend religious services we only find people who rarely attend to be more in favour of repatriation policies than people who never attend.

In terms of country characteristics presented in Model 3, we find that the effect of the GDP reaches significance: the higher the country's GDP, the less support there is for repatriation policies for criminal immigrants which is consistent with previous findings. We also find that the higher the net migration has been (over the years 1995-2000), the more support for such policies exists. The other effects of country characteristics do not reach significance. Yet, we ascertained that the effect of the proportion of non-national non-westerners is in the direction we proposed which does not hold for the effects of unemployment and asylum applications.

Table 5b. Parameter estimates from multi-level models on in favour of repatriation policies; *standard errors in brackets (N=30915)*

	Model 1	*Model 2*	*Model 3*	*Model 4*
Intercept	**0.69 (0.02)**	**0.68 (0.02)**	**0.68 (0.01)**	**0.69 (0.01)**
Individual characteristics				
Education (in years)		**-0.88^{-2} (0.00)**	**-0.88^{-2} (0.00)**	**-0.41^{-2} (0.00)**
Occupation: (higher profess.= ref.)				
Lower professionals		**0.01 (0.01)**	**0.01 (0.01)**	**0.01 (0.01)**
Routine non-manuals		**0.05 (0.01)**	**0.05 (0.01)**	**0.04 (0.01)**
Self-employed people		**0.06 (0.01)**	**0.06 (0.01)**	**0.04 (0.01)**
Skilled manuals		**0.05 (0.01)**	**0.05 (0.01)**	**0.04 (0.01)**
Unskilled manuals		**0.07 (0.01)**	**0.07 (0.01)**	**0.05 (0.01)**
Students		**-0.02 (0.01)**	**-0.02 (0.01)**	-0.01 (0.01)
Unemployed people		**0.05 (0.01)**	**0.05 (0.01)**	**0.03 (0.01)**
Retired people		**0.05 (0.01)**	**0.05 (0.01)**	**0.03 (0.01)**
Housewives		**0.05 (0.01)**	**0.05 (0.01)**	**0.03 (0.01)**
Others, not working		**0.03 (0.01)**	**0.03 (0.01)**	**0.02 (0.01)**
Income		**-8.78^{-3} (0.00)**	**-8.75^{-3} (0.00)**	-0.26^{-3} (0.00)
Age		**9.31^{-4} (0.00)**	**9.34^{-4} (0.00)**	**1.04^{-3} (0.00)**
Gender: Male (female = ref.)		**-0.01 (0.00)**	**-0.01 (0.00)**	**-0.01 (0.00)**
Urbanisation: (countryside = ref.)				
Country village		**-0.02 (0.01)**	**-0.02 (0.01)**	*-0.01 (0.01)*
Town or small city		**-0.02 (0.01)**	**-0.02 (0.01)**	**-0.02 (0.01)**
Suburbs or outskirts of big city		**-0.03 (0.01)**	**-0.03 (0.01)**	**-0.02 (0.01)**
Big city		**-0.04 (0.01)**	**-0.04 (0.01)**	**-0.03 (0.01)**
Church attendance: (never = ref.)				
Attendance once a week		-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)
Attendance once a month		-0.00 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)
Attendance rarely		*0.01 (0.00)*	*0.01 (0.00)*	**0.01 (0.00)**
Country characteristics				
Unemployment: 2002			-3.84^{-3} (0.00)	-2.18^{-3} (0.00)
GDP: 2002			**-1.36^{-2} (0.00)**	**-0.74^{-2} (0.00)**
Non-western non-nationals: 2000			4.72^{-3} (0.01)	2.98^{-3} (0.01)
Net migration: 1995-2000			**0.02 (0.01)**	0.01 (0.01)
Asylum applications: 2001-2			-0.01 (0.01)	-0.02 (0.01)
Intermediate characteristics				
Left-right placement				**8.27^{-3} (0.00)**
Perceived unsafety				**1.21^{-2} (0.00)**
Social distrust				**1.98^{-3} (0.00)**
Political distrust				**6.02^{-3} (0.00)**
Perceived ethnic threat				**0.48 (0.04)**
Variance components				
Individual	0.055	0.051	0.051	0.044
(Percentage explained)		(7.35)	(7.35)	(19.31)
Country	0.009	0.007	0.003	0.002
(Percentage explained)		(12.68)	(67.34)	(77.17)

Note: bold parameters indicate significance at p < 0.01, italic parameters indicate significance at p < 0.10.

Finally, we turn to ascertain effects of intermediate characteristics that all appear to be significant. The more right wing people are, the more they perceive that they are unsafe, the more they distrust other people and political leaders, and the more they perceive allochthonous citizens as a collective threat and consequently the stronger they favour the policy of repatriating criminal immigrants. Inclusion of these intermediate characteristics increases the percentage of explained variance and moreover reduces some of the effects of individual and contextual conditions which can be ascertained by comparing Model 3 to Model 4. The effects of educational attainment and age are strongly reduced which also holds true for the effect of income that is reduced to non-significance. Differences between some of the occupational categories are reduced, particularly differences between categories outside of the labour market and higher professionals. Finally, we find that the effect of the GDP and net migration are reduced. All these reductions (in effects) imply that the support that exists in these social categories. respectively countries. may partially be due to these intermediate characteristics of which. again. the perception of collective ethnic threat stands out as being the most decisive determinant. in terms of direct effects.

4.3.6 Evaluation of hypotheses

After these elaborate descriptions of the results of the multivariate multi-level models, we will evaluate these findings from the perspective of the hypotheses we previously derived from theories explicated in Report 1.

We proposed to test, regarding *individual conditions*, whether social categories of people in somewhat similar social positions to those of minorities support different dimensions of ethnic exclusionism more than average – hypotheses 1a to 1e.[1] Just as in most previous instances, except for the candidate countries, we first found that people who had not attained high levels of education supported all dimensions of ethnic exclusionism more strongly, which clearly corroborates *Hypothesis 1a*. Secondly, we found that particular occupational categories such as skilled and unskilled workers, but also people outside of the labour market, some of whom are dependent on social security, turned out to support ethnic exclusionism quite consistently. These findings clearly support *Hypothesis 1b and 1c*. Moreover, we found that self-employed people in particular as well as people who

[1] Hypothesis 1: Ethnic exclusionism will be strongly prevalent among social categories of the dominant group in similar social positions as social categories of ethnic ‘outgroups’, more particularly among: a) people with a low level of education; b) manual workers; c) unemployed people; d) people with a low income; and e) people living in urban areas.

perform routine non-manual work supported most of the dimensions of ethnic exclusionism. We also found clear support for *Hypothesis 1d*: people with rather low household incomes turned out to be consistently more in favour of ethnic exclusionism. Yet, the evidence we found clearly refuted *Hypothesis 1e*: we found that not people living in major cities where the majority of the minorities live, but instead, the people living in the countryside turned out to quite consistently support all dimensions of ethnic exclusionism. Taking all of these findings together corroborates a central proposition of Ethnic Competition Theory, i.e. that all of those categories that presumably hold similar (less privileged) positions on or close to the labour market, just like allochthonous people, favour ethnic exclusionism. This apparently does not hold true for people living close to allochthonous people in big cities who rather consistently disassociate themselves form ethnic exclusionism.

Regarding *contextual conditions*, related to the state of the country where respondents live, we proposed to test hypotheses 3a to 3d on the economic and demographic situation. [2] We found rather weak, non-significant yet positive effects of the presence of non-western non-nationals on most dimensions of ethnic exclusionism. We would like to mention that most of these effects were found to be in the direction we proposed to test, but only the effect on resistance to diversity reached significance. These findings do not convincingly corroborate *Hypothesis 3a* derived from Ethnic Competition Theory. The effects of net migration were consistently positive and regarding resistance to diversity and support for repatriation policies they reached significance. These findings imply that *Hypothesis 3b* is partially confirmed. This does not hold for *Hypothesis 3c* on applications for asylum: the effects of this contextual condition were found to be non-significant and inconsistent. Therefore, we have to refute this hypothesis. Considering these demographic conditions more generally, we conclude that, in spite of the fact that many effects were non-significant, the effects that turned out to reach significance were generally in line with Ethnic Competition Theory: ethnic exclusionism turned out to be more prevalent in nations where the proportion of non-western non-nationals or the influx of migrants is higher. Regarding economic conditions, we found that the effect of the level of unemployment in the countries under consideration was consistently negative, but rarely reached significance, and then only for resistance to immigrants. Therefore, we have to refute *Hypothesis 3d*. We found consistent

[2] Hypothesis 3: Ethnic exclusionism will be stronger in countries where the actual level of ethnic competition is relatively high, more particularly in contextual conditions of: a) a relatively high proportion of resident migrants; b) a relatively high level of immigrants; c) a relatively high number of asylum seekers; d) a high proportion of unemployment.

evidence on another economic condition pertaining to the effects of national economy of countries: the effect of the GDP proved to be negative, that is, the higher the level of the GDP, the lower the level of ethnic exclusionism in the country, that is the less resistance to immigrants, the less resistance to diversity and the less support for repatriation policies.

Since this effect showed up in a majority of exclusionist instances, we may conclude that this evidence supports *Hypothesis 4b*.[3] Generally speaking, ethnic exclusionism prevails to a lesser extent in more prosperous societies, which is in line with Ethnic Competition Theory.

Let us finally turn to the hypotheses on *individual perceptions*. We found that most if not all of these intermediating characteristics proved to have the effects we proposed in Report 1:[4] perceptions of decreasing personal safety (implied in *Hypothesis 2b*), social and political distrust (*Hypothesis 2c*) and more particularly the perception of collective ethnic threat (mentioned in *Hypothesis 2a*) contribute very consistently to the explanation of all dimensions of ethnic exclusionism. This evidence clearly supports *Hypotheses 2a, 2b and 2c*, and hence corroborates some crucial propositions building on Ethnic Competition Theory. Not mentioned in these hypotheses, yet taken into account, is the political orientation of Europeans. We rather consistently found that a right wing orientation increases ethnic exclusionism. Moreover, we found that these intermediating characteristics more often reduced the initial effects of individual and/or contextual conditions implying that they actually – at least partially – explain the relationships between these conditions and exclusionist stances.

Note

[3] Hypothesis 4: ethnic exclusionism will be high in contextual conditions where: b) the GDP is relatively low, so that economic prosperity cannot serve to soften or even reduce possible effects of actual levels of ethnic competition.

[4] Hypothesis 2: Ethnic exclusionism will be affected by: a) perception of collective ethnic threat; b) perception of personal threat; and c) political and social distrust.

[1] This information cannot be derived from the parameters in the table. Strictly speaking, we would have to present additionally so-called standardised parameters which then would be detrimental to the surveyability of the table. Yet, the information on these standardised parameters justifying such statements is available with the authors.

Appendix 1. List of country abbreviations

In the report's figures ISO 3166-1-Alpha-2 codes are used to present the various European countries (International Organization for Standardization, 2004). These codes are listed below in geographical order from North to South and from West to East. To these standard codes we added Germany West (DEW) and Germany East (DEE).

Country	*Code*	*Region*
Finland	FI	Nordic
Sweden	SE	Nordic
Denmark	DK	Nordic
United Kingdom	GB	Western Europe
Ireland	IE	Western Europe
Netherlands	NL	Western Europe
Belgium	BE	Western Europe
Luxembourg	LU	Western Europe
Germany – West	DEW	Western Europe
Germany – East	DEE	Eastern Europe
Austria	AT	Western Europe
Spain	ES	Mediterranean
Portugal	PT	Mediterranean
Italy	IT	Mediterranean
Greece	GR	Mediterranean
Poland	PL	Eastern Europe
Czech Republic	CZ	Eastern Europe
Hungary	HU	Eastern Europe
Slovenia	SI	Eastern Europe

Appendix 2. Data collection

The European Social Survey (ESS 2004a) is a new survey covering 22 countries. The ESS has two main aims. First, 'to monitor and interpret changing public attitudes and values within Europe..' and second 'to advance and consolidate improved methods of cross-sectional survey measurement in Europe and beyond' (ESS 2004b). The ESS project is funded by the European Commission's 5th Framework Programme, the European Science Foundation and academic funding bodies in participating countries. The ESS team emphasises the exceptional high standards of the design and of the operation of the project.

In the analyses of report 4, we selected those countries that either were member of the European Union or a candidate country in winter 2003/2004, when the actual data analyses were executed. Except for France, for which the data were not yet available, all member states were present in the ESS data set. With regard to the candidate countries, we could select four countries: Poland, Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovenia. Data on Israel, Norway and Switzerland were dropped from the data set.

For a very neat data description and sampling procedure we would like to refer to the ESS data documentation (ESS 2004b; Jowell et al. 2003). Here we limit ourselves to some basic information. It is important to emphasise that much attention has been paid to the formulations of the questions in the interviews. Scientific meetings were held to evaluate possible items to be included in the survey. Moreover, rigorous translation protocols were used. Respondent selection involved a strict random probability sampling. The fieldwork took place between autumn 2002 and spring 2003. In Austria, Luxembourg, Denmark and Italy, the fieldwork lasted until the summer of 2003. In all countries face to face interviews were conducted. The response target aimed at was very high: it was set at 70%. Therefore, much attention was paid to the training of the interviewees. In quite some countries, the response rate was indeed higher than often reported in previous data collections (e.g. the Eurobarometer), but the 70% norm was not met in most countries (see Table A4.2.1). Detailed information on country specific stratification of samples can be found in the country reports as provided by the ESS team in the ESS Documentation Report 2002 / 2003.

Table A4.2.1 Number of completed interviews and response rate by country

	Total number of completed interviews	*Response rate*	*Field work period*	*% of respondents with country's nationality*
Finland	1779	73.2%	09/02 – 12/02	98.5%
Sweden	1711	68.5%	09/02 – 12/02	97.1%
Denmark	1506	67.6%	10/02 – 06/03	97.2%
Great Britain	1813	55.5%	09/02 – 04/03	97.1%
Ireland	1923	64.5%	12/02 – 04/03	96.7%
Netherlands	2347	67.9%	09/02 – 02/03	98.1%
Belgium	1899	59.2%	10/02 - 04/03	94.9%
Luxembourg	1552	43.9%	04/03 – 08/03	69.5%
Germany	2896	57.1%	11/02 – 05/03	95.9%
Austria	2257	60.4%	02/03 - 09/03[1]	95.8%
Spain	1729	53.2%	11/02 – 01/03	97.3%
Portugal	1511	68.8%	09/02 – 01/03	97.9%
Italy	1207	43.7%	01/03 – 06/03	99.8%
Greece	2566	80.0%	01/03 – 03/03	94.7%
Poland	2110	73.2%	09/02 – 12/02	100.0%
Czech Republic	1322	43.3%	11/02 – 03/03	99.4%
Hungary	1655	69.9%	10/02 – 11/02	99.8%
Slovenia	1519	72.1%	10/02 – 11/02	99.7%

[1] *Fieldwork in two waves*

2.1 Weighting

For the European Social Survey, weights were constructed by the ESS team. The samples are weighted by differences in probabilities of selection in the sample. These selection weights are very small though. They consist of corrections of under or over representation of people in certain types of address or household, such as those in larger households. This weight does not correct for variation in response between different groups in the sample. Moreover, we constructed a weight to adjust to a standard size of 1750 interviews for each sample (875 for Luxembourg).

2.2 Selection of majority population

As the reports aim to describe the majorities' attitudes of each country, we decided to select only those respondents with the nationality of the respective country. Particularly in Luxembourg, a vast percentage had to be dropped (30.5%), which is consistent with population figures for Luxembourg and previous findings in the Eurobarometer data. For Greece and Belgium, also more than 5% of the respondents did not have the nationality of the respective countries. For other countries, the percentage is below 5%, and for Eastern European countries and Italy even below 1%.

2.3 Missing value treatment

We selected respondents based on their valid scores on the dependent variables. We first tested whether the items referring to ethnic exclusionism can be regarded as valid, reliable and cross-national comparable measurements. In these analyses, extensively described in appendix 3, we only included respondents that answered all 20 items. Respondents with missing answers on one or more of the 20 items were excluded from these analyses.

Having assessed that these 20 items indeed form a cross-national comparable measurement for various dimensions of ethnic exclusionism, we treated respondents with missing answers as follows. In order to avoid severe reductions in the numbers of respondents, we performed a well-considered procedure previously used and published in scientific journals. From the 20 items on exclusionist stances, we took the criterion that at least 50% should have been answered. This lead to a selection of 98.5% of the respondents. In other words, only 1.5% had not answered more than half of the items.

Missing values of respondents, providing that they had answered more than 50% of the items, were replaced by missing value substitution based on regression estimation. As the items correlated positively with each other (as expected), we regressed an item on all other items referring to exclusionist stances. In this manner, a missing score of a respondent on a particular item referring to ethnic exclusionism was replaced by an estimate based on the answers that this respondent provided on the other items referring to ethnic exclusionism. Substituted values were then rounded into the valid values of the original item.

Table A4.2.2 **Percentages of respondents with missing values on the measurement of the dependent variables, percentages of respondents with 10 missing values or less (which were substituted) and percentage of respondents with no missing value**

	% respondents with 11 or more missing values (dropped from analyses)	*% of respondents with 1 to 10 missing values*	*% respondents with no missing values*
Finland	0.8	8.4	90.8
Sweden	1.1	22.2	76.8
Denmark	2.0	23.7	74.3
Great Britain	0.2	11.7	88.1
Ireland	1.2	25.5	73.3
Netherlands	0.3	13.8	85.9
Belgium	0.8	19.5	79.8
Luxembourg	1.0	44.9	54.1
Germany West	0.1	18.3	81.6
Germany East	0.3	16.8	82.9
Austria	1.5	34.4	64.1
Spain	4.5	38.8	56.7
Portugal	3.0	42.7	54.2
Italy	2.4	24.3	73.3
Greece	1.2	22.3	76.5
Poland	2.6	32.7	64.7
Czech Republic	2.3	39.0	58.7
Hungary	2.4	40.0	57.6
Slovenia	1.4	21.7	76.9

Appendix 3. Measurements of ethnic exclusionism

The European Social Survey (ESS) provides valid measurements of some of the phenomena described in Report 1. In Figures 4.3.1 and 4.3.2 we present which particular dimensions of ethnic exclusionism are theoretically expected to be measured by the items. This conceptualisation of items and dimensions builds on the conceptual analysis provided in Report 1.

In this section, we test whether the items presented in figures 4.3.1 to 4.3.3 can indeed be applied as valid and reliable measurements across countries. We test this by means of structural equation modelling (Jöreskog, 1977; Jöreskog, 1993), applying the LISREL computer programme, as developed by Jöreskog and Sörbom (Jöreskog & Sörbom, 1993a, 1993b), equivalently to the description provided for the measurements in the Eurobarometer data in Reports 2 and 3. Whether, and to what extent, the applied indicators indeed refer to the same theoretical concept (or dimension thereof) can be examined by means of the measurement model. The measurement sub model of a full structural equation model describes the causal links between the unobserved theoretical concepts or latent variables and the observed or manifest variables.

Figure 4.3.1 Theoretical measurement model ESS
'resistance to immigrants' and 'resistance to asylum seekers'



Figure 4.3.2 Theoretical measurement model ESS
'resistance to diversity' and 'favour repatriation policies for criminal migrants'



Figure 4.3.3 Theoretical measurement model ESS
'favour ethnic distance' and 'perceived collective ethnic threat'



An important question in international comparative survey research is the degree of comparability of the measurement instrument: Is it possible to construct an international comparable measurement of exclusionist attitudes? If it can be demonstrated that theoretical concepts are measured in a quite comparable or equivalent manner in different countries, then we have a basis for valid cross-national comparisons. By means of multi-sample analysis, that is. the simultaneous analysis of independent random samples from several populations (Jöreskog & Sörbom, 1993a), it is possible to empirically test the equivalence of the measurement instrument in the different countries, and to assess whether, and to what extent. the measurement instruments operate in a similar fashion in these different national settings.
The causal relationships between latent and manifest variables are modelled in measurement equations. generally denoted as (cf. Bollen, 1989):

$x_q = \lambda_{q1}\xi_1 + \lambda_{q2}\xi_2 + ... + \delta_q$ (with q = 1, 2, .., the number of manifest variables x).

The entire set of measurement equations for all manifest variables written in matrix notation is:

$x = \Lambda_x \xi + \delta$

Consequently, the covariance matrix of observed variables (Σ) is defined as:

$\Sigma = \Lambda_x \Phi \Lambda_x' + \Theta_\delta$

The terms in the measurement model are defined as follows:

Variables:	x	is a *q* x 1 vector of observed indicators of ξ
	ξ	is a *n* x 1 vector of latent variables (common factors)
	δ	is a *q* x 1 vector of measurement errors (unique factors) of x
Coefficients:	Λ_x	is a *q* x *n* matrix of coefficients (factor loadings) of the regression of x on ξ
Covariance matrices:	Φ	is a *n* x *n* covariance matrix of ξ
	Θ_δ	is a *q* x *q* covariance matrix of δ

The parameters in Λ_x (lambda x), Φ(phi), and Θ_δ (theta-delta) can either be fixed, constrained, or freed. That is, parameters can either be given specified values (i.e. fixed), or parameters can be constrained to be equal to one or more other unknown parameters. Free parameters are neither fixed nor constrained. The scale indeterminacy of the latent variables is eliminated by giving the latent variable the scale of one of the observed variables (i.e. fixing a factor loading to one).

The fit of the measurement model is assessed by means of the Chi-square statistic. This statistic can be used for a goodness-of-fit test of the model against the alternative model that the covariance matrix of the observed variables is unconstrained. However, such a test is only justified if all the model assumptions are satisfied, if the sample size is sufficiently large, and if the model holds exactly in the population. Consequently, Jöreskog and Sörbom (1993a, p. 122) suggested that in practice it is more useful to regard the Chi-square statistic as a *measure* of fit rather than as a formal *test statistic*. In this view, the Chi-square statistic is a measure of the overall 'badness-of-fit' of the model to the data; the larger the Chi-square value, the worse the fit of the model.

Based on the aforementioned notions, we therefore preferred not to search for a measurement model with a 'perfect' fit (i.e. a non-significant Chi-square value), but instead to start with a model without correlated error terms, and to examine whether such a model has an acceptable model fit, as indicated by several fit indexes. In addition to the Chi-square statistic, we assessed the fit of the measurement model applying other goodness-of-fit measures such as GFI and RMSEA.[1]

As stated in the previous section, we started the search for an internationally comparable measurement instrument of ethnic exclusionism with an original pool of items. Each item is assumed to indicate one and only one theoretical variable. To select the best cross-nationally equivalent indicators for nationalistic attitudes and ethnic exclusionism we applied the following procedures and criteria. Step-by-step, we excluded indicators that were less suitable, as judged by the goodness-of-fit of the LISREL model and a detailed examination of the parameter estimates. That is, we subsequently removed items that were hardly affected by the latent variable, as shown by a low explained item-variance ($R^2 < .20$ on average in the samples), indicating that this item cannot be regarded as a reliable indicator for the proposed (dimension of the) theoretical concept. However, before excluding such an item from further analyses, we checked whether the specific item should not in fact have been regarded as an indicator of a *different* (dimension of a) theoretical concept than the one we initially presumed. If this was the case, this is indicated by a considerable high modification index for a zero-element of the matrix of factor loadings, indicating that freeing and estimating this factor loading (i.e. allowing a relationship

between the item and a different concept than the one originally proposed) will improve the fit of the model considerably. The modification indices for factor loading parameters were also examined in order to check whether items – on average in the different samples – referred to more than one latent variable, indicating that the specific item cannot be applied to discriminate between the different theoretical concepts (or dimensions thereof). In this manner, we selected a set of indicators that – on average in all the samples – can be regarded as valid, reliable, and one-dimensional indicators.

Firstly, we assumed that the form of the measurement model is the same in the different countries.[2] That is, the parameter matrices (Λ_x, Φ, and Θ_δ) of the measurement models in the different countries have the same dimensions (in other words, each model has the same numbers of observed and latent variables) and the same pattern of fixed and freed elements. Consequently, in this model, an observed variable is regarded as an indicator of the *same* theoretical construct in the different countries. Each observed variable is strictly one-dimensional, referring to only one theoretical variable. Furthermore, following the theoretical expectations, the theoretical variables are allowed to covariate: the model therefore gives an oblique solution. In addition, the measurement errors of the observed variables are assumed not to be correlated with each other. With respect to comparability across different countries, the model only assumes comparability in model form, and not in parameter values: all non-fixed parameters are allowed to vary across countries. If we found problems for countries with respect to relatively bad fit, we decided to add country specific error variance correlations or double loadings. For the double loadings we used the criterion that it should be at least .20 smaller than the loadings of the other indicators on the same phenomenon.

The second model assumes not only an invariant model form, but also invariant relationships between indicators and theoretical variables, in other words, invariant factor loadings across countries. In this model, there are no cross-national differences with respect to the (relative) degree in which indicators refer to a theoretical variable.[3] If this model is acceptable, it seems more likely that the same latent variables are being tapped in the different countries (Williams & Thomson, 1986).

3.1 Invariance in measurement models in countries of the European Social Survey 2003 (ESS), regarding measurements of 'resistance to immigrants' and 'resistance to asylum seekers'

The ESS data contain some measurements that presumably refer to 'resistance to immigrants'. Indeed, at first, the LISREL procedure provided one factor of 'resistance to immigrants', regardless of the reference in the item formulation to the country of origin (respectively, poor or rich countries and from within Europe or outside Europe). However, in numerous countries, respondents distinguished between resistance to immigrants from richer countries and immigrants from poorer countries, making the measurement incomparable between the countries in the ESS dataset. We therefore made a selection of items that refer to resistance to immigrants of people from poorer countries, combined with the item referring to immigrants of a different race. We expected these items to refer to one phenomenon of 'resistance to immigrants'.
'Resistance to asylum seekers' was measured by three items referring to rights that asylum seekers should have while their cases are considered. Question d53 ('refugees should be kept in detention centres while cases are considered') and d51 ('government should be generous judging applications for refugee status') did not relate to this exclusionist stance. Two other questions regarding refugees were for many people hard to answer, resulting in high percentages of missing values, particularly in Portugal and Spain. This was the reason to leave out question d49 ('(country) has more than its fair share of people applying for refugee status') and question d52 ('most refugee applicants don't fear persecution in own countries').

First, we tested whether the proposed model as presented in Figure 4.3.1 would fit the overall ESS sample.[4] This turned out be the case. The largest modification index was for the covariance between the measurement errors of d55 ('granted refugees should be entitled to bring close family members') and d7 ('allow many/few immigrants from poorer countries in Europe'). As overall fit statistics were satisfactory though (see model A1, Table A4.3.1), we continued multi-sampling with the more simple model.
To test equivalence in model form across all countries in the dataset, we followed the multi-sample procedure. The overall RMSEA statistic met the criterion, as it was .018 (Model A2, Table A4.3.1), but Chi-square statistics and the modification indices provided information of relatively bad fit for separate countries. Relatively bad fit statistics were found for Greece, East Germany, Belgium, Hungary and Luxembourg. Obviously, modification indices suggested to free covariances of measurement errors particularly in

these countries. Step by step, we freed such measurement error covariances. In the final step, the largest modification index was found for Finland. As for Finland the GFI was larger than .98 and hence satisfactory, we chose for the simpler model. As for Luxembourg, GFI statistics stayed low, we freed the covariance of the measurement errors between d55 and d7 for the country too, making the GFI increase to .965. The model turned out to fit the data well, as for all countries the RMR statistic was lower than .05.

We then tested this model, providing us with evidence for equivalent model form, for invariant factor loadings. As the fit statistics turned out to be satisfactory, as provided in table A4.3.1, *we can conclude that dimensions of 'resistance to immigrants' and 'resistance to asylum seekers' can be equivalently measured in all countries by the same indicators.*

Table A4.3.1 Invariance in measurement models of attitudes towards immigrants: 'resistance to immigrants' and 'resistance to asylum seekers'.

	RMSEA	χ^2	*df*	*GFI*	*CFI*	*Problem identification*	*Problem solved by:*
Model A1: Europe-wide (d5,d7,d9; dichotomised) (d50,d54,d55)	.008	22.97	8	.9982	.9986	-	
Multi-sample models							
Form equivalence							
Model A2	.018	218.83	152	[1]	.9837	Large modification indices and relatively low GFI's in some countries [2]	Freeing country specific error covariances
Model A3 country specific error covariances	.001	142.16	142	[3]	.9906		
Invariant factor loadings							
Model A4 country specific error covariances	.014	271.82	212	[4]	.9871		

Note: multi-sample analyses of 19 samples; Source: ESS

[1] GFI statistics lower than .97 for Greece (.950), East Germany (.963), Belgium (.966), Sweden (.964), Hungary (.967) and Luxembourg (.927).

[2] Modification indices were controlled after each analysis. The largest modification index was then adjusted, by freeing error covariances; respectively the following modification indices (MI) were provided and error covariances were step by step allowed (within parentheses); Belgium MI = 486.62; (d50, d9); Portugal: MI = 443.32; (d54, d7); Greece: MI=268.56; (d50, d7); The Netherlands: (d55, d9); Sweden: MI = 225.45; (d55, d5); Sweden: MI = 1686.17; (d54, d7); Denmark: (d55, d7); Germany East: MI = 155.78; (d54, d7). Hereafter, the largest modification index was found for Finland, but as statistics were satisfactory for the country, we left the model for Finland unadjusted. For Luxembourg, the relatively low GFI was improved by freeing the covariance of the errors of d55 and d7.

[3] GFI statistics were larger than .97 for all countries, except Luxembourg (.965) and Hungary (.967).

[4] GFI statistics were larger than .97 for all countries, except for Spain (.956) and Hungary (.957). Moreover, two additional error covariances were freed: (d55, d50) for Italy and (d54, d7) for the Netherlands.

Model 1 Unstandardised measurement model of dimensions of attitudes towards ethnic minorities

'resistance to immigrants' and 'resistance to asylum seekers'



3.2 Invariance in measurement models in countries of the European Social Survey 2003 (ESS) regarding measurements of 'resistance to diversity' and 'favour repatriation policies for criminal migrants'

The European Social Survey contained a number of items that presumably refer to either 'resistance to diversity' or 'favour repatriation policies for criminal migrants'. However, some of these items could not be included in our analysis. In figure 4.3.2 two items are displayed referring to repatriation policies. An additional question, d21, refers to repatriation in case of unemployment. The statement read: "If people who have come to live and work here are unemployed for a long period, they should be made to leave". However, this item had a rather low correlation with the other two 'repatriation' items, in particular in Southern and Eastern European countries. Hence, we could not include this item in a scale of 'repatriation policies'.

Two additional items (questions d42 and d43) touching upon resistance to diversity could also not be included in our analysis. The questions read "It is better for a country if almost everyone is able to speak at least one common language" and "Communities of people who have come to live here should be allowed to educate their children in their own separate schools if they wish". The correlation between these two items was however rather low (overall polychoric correlation was .13), indicating that they cannot be included in a reliable measurement scale. Moreover, the relation between these items and d40 and d41 was even lower in a large number of countries and sometimes these items were even negatively related. Therefore, to indicate the 'resistance to diversity' we restricted our analysis to item d40 and d41.

The proposed measurement model as presented in Figure 3.2. had a rather satisfactory fit in an overall analysis of all countries. As shown in Table A4.3.2., the Goodness of Fit statistic was very high (.999) and the RMSEA (.032) was well below the boundary value of .05, indicating a close fit of the model in relation to the degrees of freedom (Browne & Cudeck, 1992).

However, when we looked at the fit in each separate country, it turned out that the model did not fit the data in Luxembourg. This is due to the correlation between the two items of 'resistance to diversity' (d40 and d41). Overall, these two items were moderately related with a polychoric correlation of 0.39. In contrast, the polychoric correlation was negative (–0.06) in Luxembourg. Hence, in Luxembourg these two items could not be regarded as

both referring to the same theoretical construct. We can conclude that 'resistance to diversity' could not be measured in Luxembourg with a scale consisting of both item d40 and d41. Due to this anomaly, a multi-sample analysis provided no parameter estimates if Luxembourg was included in the analyses. Therefore, we removed Luxembourg from the multi-sample analysis, as displayed in Table A4.3.2.

A model with cross-national equivalence in model form had a very satisfactory RMSEA statistic of .022. Due to some Heywood[5] cases (estimated negative variances of measurement errors) we had to fix the measurement error variance of d40 in Eastern Germany and of d24 in Italy and Hungary. After these measurement error variances had been set to a fixed value of .05, the fit hardly changed. The high value of the Comparative Fit Index (.9972) and the satisfactory RMSEA value of .019 indicate that – with the exception of Luxembourg – the indicators referred to the same theoretical constructs in each country.

Next we tested whether the factor loadings were invariant across countries. Since there were no Heywood cases in this model (labelled B2 in Table A4.3.2) no fixation of any measurement error variances was required. The model with invariant factor loadings had a close fit, as judged by the RMSEA-value. The overall Comparitive Fit Index was very high (CFI = .99), as well as the Goodness of Fit index in each separate country. In each national sample, the GFI was larger than .99, except for Sweden (.98) and Denmark (.99). These findings indicate that – with the exception of Luxembourg – there were no cross-national differences with respect to the (relative) degree in which items capture the theoretical constructs. Below table A4.3.2 the unstandardised factor loadings are presented. We found that in Luxembourg the items d40 and d41 cannot be applied as a reliable measurement instrument for 'resistance to diversity'.

We can conclude that. with the exception of Luxembourg, the dimensions of *'resistance to diversity'* and *'favour repatriation policies for criminal migrants' can be equivalently measured in all countries by the same indicators.*

Table A4.3.2 Invariance in measurement models of attitudes towards immigrants: 'resistance to diversity' and 'favour repatriation policies for criminal migrants'.

	RMSEA	χ^2	*df*	*GFI*	*CFI*	*Problem identification:*	*Problem solved by:*
Overall analysis:							
Europe-wide							
Model B1: (d40, d41) and (d23, d24)	.032	32.07	1	.9990	.9980		
Multi-sample models							
Form equivalence							
Model B1			19			Cannot be estimated for Luxembourg	Removing Luxembourg
Model B2: excluding Luxembourg	.022	32.15	18		.9975	Negative error variances for d40 in DE and for d24 in I, GR, and H (Heywood cases)	Fixation of error variances to .05
Model B3: excluding Luxembourg, and fixation of the specific error variances to .05	.019	35.16	22	[1)]	.9971		
Invariant factor loadings							
Model B2: excluding Luxembourg.	.034	151.99	52	[2)]	.9903		

Note: multi-sample analyses of 19 samples; Source: ESS2002/2003

[1)] GFI-statistics are computed per sample, which turned out to be larger than .99 for each sample.

[2)] GFI-statistics are computed per sample, which turned out to be larger than .99 for each sample, except for Sweden and Denmark (.98).

Model 2 Unstandardised measurement model of dimensions of attitudes towards ethnic minorities

'resistance to diversity' and 'favour repatriation policies for criminal migrants'



3.3 Invariance in measurement models in European countries of the European Social Survey 2003 (ESS) regarding measurements of 'favour ethnic distance' and 'perceived collective ethnic threat'

In this section we test the proposed measurement model as depicted in Figure 4.3.3. This model with 4 items referring to 'favour ethnic distance' and 6 items referring to 'perceived collective ethnic threat' had merely a moderate fit in an overall analysis at the European level. As shown in table A4.3.3 the Goodness of Fit index was merely .90 and the RMSEA statistic of .091 was rather unsatisfactory as only values below .08 or below .05 are regarded as respectively, a reasonable fit or a close fit.

How could we improve the fit of this measurement model? We first took a closer look at the correlations and the results from explorative factor analysis. The correlation matrix clearly supported the notion of two separate dimensions referring to 'ethnic distance' and to 'ethnic threat'. The four items presumably referring to 'favour ethnic distance' had very high correlations and only moderate correlations with the other six items. The six items presumably referring to 'perceived collective ethnic threat' also had strong correlations. Furthermore, explorative factor analyses – at the European level as well as in separate countries – provided no clear indications of a factor structure with more dimensions. For instance, in each country, exploratory factor analysis of six 'threat' items (d25 to d30) yielded a one-dimensional factor structure. We also tried to enforce a two-dimensional structure on these six 'threat' items by means of a confirmatory factor analysis. These results indicated that the fit of the measurement model could not be improved by distinguishing more dimensions. Instead, we tried to improve the fit by adding covariances between measurement error terms.

When we looked at the question formulation of d34 to d37, it became clear that the items not only refer to 'ethnic distance', but also share more similarities. For instance, items d34 and d35 have in common that they both refer to 'an immigrant of the same race/ethnic group as the majority', whereas items d34 and d36 have in common that they both refer to the situation in which 'the boss is an immigrant'. Whereas all four items were highly correlated, the correlation matrix also indicated that the correlation between two items was even higher when they both referred to the same reference group ('same' versus 'other race/ethnic group') and/or when they both refer to the same social domain ('a boss' versus 'a close relative'). This can be modelled into the measurement model by incorporating covariances between the measurement error terms of the items. In model C2 in Table

A4.3.3 we estimated the covariances of the measurement errors between d34 and d35 ('same group'), between d36 and d37 ('other group'), between d34 and d36 ('boss') and between d35 and d37 ('a close relative'). The size of a covariance between measurement errors indicates the degree to which two items have something in common, besides referring to the same theoretical construct of 'ethnic distance'.

As can be seen in Table A4.3.3, the fit of model C2 was much larger than the previous model. The RMSEA statistic was just at the criterion of .05. The fit of the measurement model could be further improved be incorporating covariances between the measurement errors of the six items referring to 'perceived collective ethnic threat'. Items d25 to d27 have in common that the question contents refer to economic issues, whereas the items d28 to d30 are non-economic statements. Model C3 incorporated measurement error covariances between the items referring to 'economic threat', that is an covariance between the measurement errors of d25 and d26, between d25 and d27, and between d26 and d27. In addition, in model C4 covariances between the measurement errors of d28 and d29, between d28 and d30, and between d29 and d30 were incorporated. The fit of the measurement model gradually improved. Model C4 had a satisfactory fit, as shown by the high overall goodness of fit measures of GFI and CFI and a RMSEA statistics of .037, indicating a close fit.

To test equivalence of the model across all countries. we conducted a multi-sample procedure. Regarding the model with equivalence in model form we were confronted with some estimation problems. Separate analysis of each country showed that these were caused by Heywood cases in two countries. In Greece, the estimated measurement error variance of d36 was negative, as was the error variance of d37 in Denmark. When these two error variances were fixed at a value of .05 in the respective countries, there were no longer any estimation problems in the separate analyses of each country. In order to prevent estimation problems in a multi-sample analysis, however, we also had to fix the covariances between measurement errors associated with these two items (d36 in Greece and d37 in Denmark). In Greece, the covariances between the measurement errors of d36 and d37 and between d34 and d36 were set to zero. Likewise, in Denmark, we set the measurement error covariances between d35 and d37 and between d36 and d37 to zero. Consequently, the degrees of freedom of this model increased with 6, as is displayed in Table A4.3.3. The fit of this model was rather high, with an overall CFI of .998 and a RMSEA value of .035, indicating a close fit.

Finally, we tested the invariance of factor loadings across countries. Since we encountered no Heywood cases in this analysis, no adjustments for Greece or Denmark had to be made. The fit of this more restrictive model was still quite satisfactory. The overall CFI was .986 and the RSMEA value of .048 indicated a close fit. Hence, *we can conclude that dimensions of 'favour ethnic distance' and 'perceived collective ethnic threat' can be equivalently measured by the same indicators across all countries.* The unstandardised factor loadings of this model are presented below Table A.3.3.

Table A4.3.3 Invariance in measurement models of attitudes towards immigrants: 'favour ethnic distance' and 'perceived collective ethnic threat'

Subsequent models	*RMSEA*	χ^2	*df*	*GFI*	*CFI*	*Problem identification:*	*Problem solved by:*
Overall analysis:							
Europe-wide							
Model C1: (d34 to d37) and (d25 to d30)	.091	7440.45	34	.8989	.9134		
Model C2: including error covariances for indicators of ethnic distance [1)]	.050	2018.07	30	.9726	.9858		
Model C3: also including error covariances for indicators of perceived economic threat [2)]	.043	1374.95	27	.9810	.9904		
Model C4: also including error covariances for indicators of perceived non-economic threat [3)]	.037	878.23	24	.9875	.9936		
Multi-sample models							
Form equivalence							
Model C4			456			Not estimable due to two Heywood cases in GR and DK	Fixation of these two error variances and accompanying error covariances
Model C4 with Adjustments in GR and DK [4)]	.035	1262.79	462	[5)]	.9980		
Invariant factor loadings							
Model C4 [6)]	.048	2557.19	600	[7)]	.9857		

Note: multi-sample analyses of 19 samples; Source: ESS2002/2003

[1)] Error terms for indicators of ethnic distance that refer to the same reference group (respectively 'same race/ethnic group' or 'different race/ethnic group') or that refer to the same social domain (respectively ' your boss' or 'a close relative of you') are correlated. Hence, error covariances for the following sets of items were estimated: items d34 and d35; d36 and d37; d34 and d36; d35 and d37.

[2)] Explorative factor analysis indicates a one-dimensional factor structure for the 6 indicators of perceived threat. To account for the fact that the content of items d25, d26, and d27 to economic forms of threat, the error terms for these items were interrelated.

[3)] The other three indicators of perceived threat (d28, d29, and d30) items refer to non-economic forms of perceived threat. To account for the similarity in item content, the error terms for these items were also interrelated.

[4)] In Greece, the error variance of d36 was set to .05. The error covariances between d36 and d37, as well as between d34 and d36 were set to zero in Greece to derive a model that could be estimated in multisample analysis. Likewise, in Denmark the error variance of d37 was set to .05. The error covariances associated with this item (error covariance between d35 and d37 and between d36 and d37) were set to zero in Denmark.

[5)] GFI-statistics are computed per sample, which turned out to .97 of higher for each sample, with the exception of Denmark and Luxembourg (.95).

[6)] In the multisample model with invariant factor loadings, no adjustments for Greece and Denmark were necessary.

[7)] GFI-statistics are computed per sample, which turned out to .97 of higher for each sample, with the exception of Luxembourg (.94), and Austria, Italy, and the Eastern part of Germany (.96).

Model 3 Unstandardised measurement model of dimensions of attitudes towards ethnic minorities

'favour ethnic distance' and 'perceived collective ethnic threat'



3.4 Sum indices of dimensions of ethnic exclusionism

The previous analyses were conducted among respondents without missing answers. Having assessed that these 20 items indeed form a cross-national comparable measurement for various dimensions of ethnic exclusionism, we used this result to estimate missing answers of respondents. A missing score of a respondent on a particular item referring to ethnic exclusionism was replaced by a regression estimate based on the answers that this respondent provided on the other items referring to ethnic exclusionism. However, this procedure was only followed if a respondent answered more than half of the items referring to ethnic exclusionism. Respondents with less valid answers were excluded from all analyses.

After substitution of missing values, we computed summated indices for each dimension of ethnic exclusionism. The indices are recoded on a scale from 0 to 1. Throughout this report, these indices are applied to measure exclusionist stances. The mean score on these indices across all countries and per country are displayed in Appendix 6. Table A4.3.4. displays the overall relationships between the indices of the dimensions of ethnic exclusionism.

The strongest relationship exists between ‘resistance to immigrants’ and ‘perceived collective ethnic threat’. The more people perceive ethnic minorities as a threat, the stronger they resists to immigration of non-nationals to their country. Moreover, all exclusionist stances correlate strongest with this measurement of perceived collective ethnic threat. All other correlations are positive too (as expected) and quite similar in their strength.

Table A4.3.4. Relationships between dimensions of ethnic exclusionism

	A	*B*	*C*	*D*	*E*	*F*
Resistance to immigrants *(A)*	1.00					
Resistance to asylum seekers *(B)*	.38	1.00				
Resistance to diversity *(C)*	.38	.25	1.00			
Favour ethnic distance *(D)*	.38	.29	.33	1.00		
Favour repatri-ation policies for criminal migrants *(E)*	.38	.31	.33	.31	1.00	
Perceived collective ethnic threat *(F)*	.55	.44	.44	.43	.41	1.00

Note: EU-average. National samples were given an equal weight, irrespective of the sample size: all countries were given a standard sample size of 1750, whereas Luxembourg was given a standard sample size of 875.

Appendix 4. Measurements of independent variables at the individual level

To measure the first of our independent variables, *educational attainment*, we used information on the highest educational level of the respondent. For this measurement of education, the ISCED 1977 coding scheme has been used. This country-specific measurement, which distinguishes seven educational categories, has been used in the descriptive analyses and ranges from 'not completed primary education' to 'second stage of tertiary'. In the multilevel analyses we made use of an interval measurement of attained education in years, due to empty cells of the ISCED measurement in some countries. In order to assign a numerical value for the respondents who were still studying at the time of survey, we took their study length at the time of the interview. Furthermore, to prevent extreme high scores on the educational attainment variable, we regarded 20 years of education as an upper-limit.

With regard to *social class* we distinguished between people presently employed and non-employed people. For those respondents currently employed, we recoded the available occupational classification codes into the nominal class typology of Erikson, Goldthorpe and Portocarero (1979). In the European Social Survey the International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO) of the International Labour Office of the United Nations was applied. To derive the EGP categories from ISCO88, we followed the procedures of and standard modules generated by Ganzeboom, Luijkx and Treiman (1989) and Ganzeboom and Treiman (1996). In order to construct more appropriate EGP categories, the occupational classification is enhanced by additional information on employment status and supervisory status. We used information that indicated whether respondents were self-employed or not and whether they supervised others at work. For the self-employed, the number of employees was taken into account. For respondents who supervised others at work, the number of employees under supervision was taken into account. Some of the constructed categories turned out to be rather small. These small categories (with less than 4% of respondents) were added to one of the other categories. We distinguished higher professionals, lower professionals and routine non-manual workers. Self-employed people with or without employees as well as farmers were subsumed into one single category of self-employed people. Manual supervisors and skilled manual workers were taken together as a separate category. The final occupational social class category was that of the unskilled manual workers, to which farm labourers were added. To these occupational categories we added distinct categories of people who

were momentarily not active in the labour force: students; unemployed people; retired people, sick or disabled people; people working in their own household and looking after their children; and lastly, a rest category that could not be categorised (among which people in military service).

In the ESS dataset, monthly net-household *income* was measured with a standard number of categories with standard ranges. Only for Ireland and Hungary country specific coding schemes were used. The ESS documentation provided information on how to make the country-specific coding congruent with the standard coding. To compare incomes between countries, for each country separately the mean income was set to one. Missing values for household income were – for each country separately – imputed by an estimated value based on other information that is available for the respondents. We estimated missing income values by means of a regression analysis of household income on four variables that are related to household income.[6]

Urbanisation was measured by means of five categories: 'farm home or countryside', 'country village', 'town or small city', 'suburbs or outskirts of big city' and 'a big city', as judged by the respondent. We used information on religious attendance, which we categorised into 'never', 'rarely', 'once a month' and 'frequently', which is more than once a month. *Political self-placement* was measured by asking respondents to place their own political viewpoints on an eleven point scale, ranging from left (score 0) to right (score 10). Finally, we included *gender* and *age* as variables in the analysis.

In the multilevel analyses we also included intermediate characteristics. For the measurement of perceived ethnic threat, we refer to appendix 2. *Perceived unsafety* was measured by one question whether respondents felt unsafe walking in the street after dark. This measurement runs on a four-points scale from 'very safe' to 'very unsafe'.

Social distrust was measured with three items, which with reliability analyses turned out to form a strong scale (Cronbach's alpha= .77). The three items 'you can't be too careful versus most people can be trusted', 'most people try to take advantage of you versus most people try to be fair' and 'most people look out for themselves versus most people try to be helpful' were recoded so that a high score means distrust in other people and a low score means low social distrust. Then, we took the mean score of the three items, on which one missing value was allowed.

Political distrust was measured with four items ('politicians in general care what people like respondent think'; 'politicians are interested in votes rather than in peoples' opinions'; 'trust in country's parliament'; and 'trust in politicians'). The items were transformed into items with similar scale lengths, running from 0 to 10, at which 10 means 'no trust'. After factor analyses showed the single dimensionality and reliability analyses provided satisfactory statistics (Cronbach's alpha = .76), we computed one scale of political distrust, by taking the mean of the scores on the four items. Respondents were allowed to have one missing value. A high score of zero means no political distrust, whereas a score of 10 means much political distrust. Only 25% of the respondents scored lower than the score of 5 and showed political trust.

Appendix 5. Measurements of independent variables at the contextual level

Individuals, as social beings, are affected by their surrounding social contexts. In this report we focus on the impact of the national context on individual attitudes towards ethnic minorities and immigrants. In order to explain cross-national differences in ethnic exclusionism, we searched for appropriate operationalisations and measurements of national contextual characteristics. However, one should be cautious when comparing national statistics. The comparability of national statistics can be problematic, due to cross-national differences in applied definitions, modes of registration and classification. Furthermore, there can be sizeable differences in the reliability of national statistics between countries. In order to minimise these problems of comparability, contextual data are primarily derived from internationally recognised organisations, such as Eurostat, the United Nations Population Division and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. The statistical departments of these international organisations have put a lot of effort in the standardisation of definitions and data collection methods in order to improve consistency and comparability of indicators across countries.

In the ESS dataset 18 countries are included we analysed. During data collection, four of these countries were candidate countries of the European Union, becoming member in 2004: Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia. We analysed the German data separately for (former) West and East Germany, due to the large differences in political and economic developments that took place after the Second World War, as well as the vast differences in economic and demographic circumstances that still exist between East and West Germany today. Hence, East and West Germany are regarded as separate 'national' contexts. However, some contextual variables, such as the number of asylum applications, are by definition only defined for Germany as a whole.

The national statistical data for the countries included in the European Social Survey are displayed in table A4.5.1. Figures on the *unemployment rate* in 2002 were taken from Eurostat (2003a) and they refer to the number of unemployed persons as a share of the total active population. The estimates of the number of unemployed are based on the results of the European Union Labour Force Survey. Unemployed persons are those aged 15 to 74 years not living in collective households who were without work within the two weeks following the reference week and have actively sought employment at some time during the previous four weeks or who found a job to start within a period of at most three months.

We applied the unemployment rate in 2002, since this is the latest available annual figure on the unemployment rate.

We applied data from the German national statistical office (Statistisches Bundesamt) to derive the unemployment rate in (former) West and East Germany. The unemployment rate for Germany as a whole, as reported by Eurostat (2003a), was adjusted for the ratio in unemployment rates in West Germany and East Germany, as reported by the Statistisches Bundesamt (2003a).

Figures on Gross Domestic Product were taken from Eurostat (2003b). GDP is measured per head in thousands of PPS (Purchasing Power Standards) at current prices, indexed at 100 for the 15 EU members, in the year 2002. At the time we started the analyses, only these indexed figures were available for 2002. Next, these relative figures are multiplied with the actual GDP per head in thousands for the EU (Eurostat 2003c) to derive the actual GDP for each country. The German figure was adjusted for East Germany and West Germany by the GDP ratio for the regions as reported by the Statistisches Bundesamt (2003b).

As a measurement of the presence of ethnic minorities in a country, we took for the Western European countries the number of *non-nationals with a non-Western citizenship* as a percentage of the total population and accounted for the number of naturalisations in the last 15 years. The latest available figures from Eurostat (2003d) refer to January 1, 2000. In this measurement, non-nationals with a citizenship of Western industrialised countries are not taken into account. That is, non-nationals with a citizenship from one of the European Union countries, the European Free Trade Association countries, or the United States, Canada, Australia or New-Zealand are excluded from the total number of non-nationals. For Austria and Luxembourg, the figures refer to the percentage of non-EU nationals. We derived separate figures for former West and East Germany based on the figure for reunified Germany, as reported by Eurostat, and the ratio of the percentage of foreigners in former West and East Germany, as reported by the Statistisches Bundesamt (2003a). Similarly, separate figures for Great Britain and Northern Ireland were derived by adjusting the figure for the United Kingdom with the ratio of ethnic minority groups in the UK and the respective regions, as found in the UK Census of April 2001 (Office for National Statistics, 2003). As in some countries the number of naturalisations is much larger than in others – particularly in Sweden, Belgium and the Netherlands (Eurostat 2003d; OECD 2004) – and most naturalisations are applied to non-western citizens (OECD 2004), we included these numbers of naturalisations in our measurement of *non-nationals with a non-*

Western citizenship. For Greece, the statistics on the number of non-nationals provided by Eurostat from 1998 turned out to deviate strongly form the latest Greek Census data (2001). Therefore, we decided to take into account the latter statistics. The Greek Census results report the number of inhabitants by citizenship to which we added the number of naturalisations as reported by Eurostat (General Secretariat of National Statistical Services of Greece 2004; Eurostat 2003d). For Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia, similar figures from Eurostat were not available. We used the percentage of foreign citizens as reported by OECD statistics for Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland (OECD 2004). For Slovenia we used migrant stock as reported by the UNDP (2000).

From the United Nations Population Division (2002), we derived the *average annual net migration in the period 1995 to 2000, per 1,000 capita.* The average annual net migration is the net average annual number of migrants during the period, that is, the annual number of immigrants less the annual number of emigrants, including both citizens and non-citizens.

Finally, we took the *average number of asylum applications in 2001 and 2002 per 1,000 capita* as an additional indicator. Figures regarding the number of asylum applications are quite suitable for international comparison as compared to other figures on asylum seekers, such as the number of admitted refugees. It is much more complicated to produce comparable figures regarding the number of admitted refugees, due to cross-national differences in legal regulations, residence permits (e.g. provisional versus durable permits), as well as differences in registration, classification and political circumstances in general. The number of asylum applications in each country is registered by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (2002, 2003). To take into account strong yearly fluctuations, we took the average number of asylum applications in the two years preceding the time of survey, that is in 2001 and 2002. To compare the burden of the absolute numbers of asylum applications across countries, we related this to the size of the total population as derived from Eurostat (2003d).

Table A4.5.1 Contextual characteristics of countries in the ESS

Country	*Unemployment rate in 2002* [a]	*GDP per capita in 2002*	*(Non-Western) non-nationals in percentage of population in 2000* [c]	*Average annual net migration in 1995-2000,per 1,000 capita* [d]	*Average annual number of asylum applications in 2001 and 2, per 1,000 capita* [e]
Finland	9.1	24.79	1.7	0.8	0.49
Sweden	4.9	24.50	7.7	1.0	3.18
Denmark	4.5	27.48	4.9 [j]	2.7	1.73
Great Britain	5.1 [f]	24.77 [h]	3.4 [k]	1.6	1.89
Ireland	4.4	30.12	1.1 [l]	4.9	3.53
Netherlands	2.7	27.05	6.6	2.1	1.60
Belgium	7.3	25.97	6.2	1.3	2.28
Luxembourg	2.8	45.46	12.0 [j]	9.4	1.95
Germany West	6.5 [g]	26.50 [i]	8.5 [m]	2.8	1.09
Germany East	15.2 [g]	16.45 [i]	3.6 [m]	1.1	1.09
Austria	4.3	26.90	10.2 [n]	0.6	4.27
Spain	11.3	20.23	1.5	0.9	0.20
Portugal	5.1	16.49	1.3	1.3	0.02
Italy	9.0	24.55	2.0 [o]	2.0	0.15
Greece	10.0	15.82	6.7 [p]	3.3	0.53
Poland	19.9	9.46	0.1 [q]	-0.5	0.12
Czech Republic	7.3	14.38	2.0 [q]	1.0	1.41
Hungary	5.6	13.58	1.1 [q]	-0.7	0.80
Slovenia	6.0	17.71	2.6 [q]	0.5	2.22

[a] Source: Eurostat (2003a). Unemployed persons as a share of the total active population.

[b] Source: Eurostat (2003a). GDP per capita in purchasing power standards.

[c] Non-nationals with a non-Western citizenship as percentage of total population on January 1, 2000. Only non-nationals with a non-Western citizenship are displayed: non-nationals with a citizenship from one of the European Union countries, the European Free Trade Association countries, or the United States, Canada, Australia or New-Zealand are not taken into account. Source: Eurostat (2003b). For Poland, Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovenia figures refer to percentages of foreign citizens: Source: for Poland, Czech Republic and Hungary: OECD (2004) and for Slovenia: United Nations Population Division (2002).

[d] Source: United Nations Population Division (2002).

[e] Source for asylum application figures: UNHCR (2002, 2003). Total population on January, 1, 2001 and 2002 derived from Eurostat (2003b).

[f] Source: Eurostat (2003a) and Office for National Statistics (2002).

[g] Source: Eurostat (2003a) and Statistisches Bundesamt (2003).

[h] Source: Eurostat (2003a) and Office for National Statistics (2003a).

[i] Source: Eurostat (2003a) and Statistisches Bundesamt (2003b).

[j] Data January 1, 1999
[k] Data spring 1998. Source: Eurostat (2003b) and Office for National Statistics (2003).
[l] Data April 1999
[m] Source: Eurostat (2003b) and Statistisches Bundesamt (2003).
[n] Data on naturalisation for 1995 and for 1999 imputed by average of 1996 to 1998
[o] Data on naturalisation for 1995 to 1999 taken from OECD (2004) Trends in International Migration.
[p] Data January 1, 2001, Greek census data; data on naturalisation for 1995 and for 1999 imputed by average of 1996 to 1998.
[q] Data exclude number of naturalisations, which were not available in the Eurostat publications. OECD (2004) estimates of a shorter period show relatively small numbers for the respective countries.

Appendix 6: Grand means, means per country and percentages of support for exclusionist stances

Table A4.6.1 Mean score and percentage support on 'resistance to immigrants' and 'resistance to asylum seekers' per country.

	Resistance to immigrants		*Resistance to asylum seekers*		
Country	*Mean* [a]	*% support* [b]	*Mean* [c]	*% support* [b]	*N*
Finland	.530	59.24	.344	15.10	1953
Sweden	.299	14.64	.361	10.94	1920
Denmark	.486	50.45	.387	19.02	1435
United Kingdom	.523	51.04	.537	47.88	1988
Ireland	.431	35.27	.440	28.44	1954
Netherlands	.484	42.95	.480	36.47	2311
Belgium	.486	44.16	.529	48.41	1789
Luxembourg	.521	52.74	.353	15.14	1068
West Germany	.442	37.80	.441	27.79	1709
East Germany	.499	47.54	.498	39.78	1086
Austria	.550	64.37	.404	25.15	2129
Spain	.474	50.24	.384	18.37	1606
Portugal	.596	62.47	.425	23.89	1434
Italy	.433	36.50	.441	27.93	1176
Greece	.695	87.48	.446	31.13	2401
Poland	.471	43.77	.386	16.72	2055
Czech Republic	.514	49.76	.440	29.99	1321
Hungary	.682	86.53	.538	47.47	1641
Slovenia	.485	43.20	.481	34.70	1493
All countries [d]	.505	50.47	.440	29.01	32469
All countries [e]	.485	46.43	.449	30.23	32469

[a] Based on a four-point scale, recoded on a scale from 0 to 1.

[b] To compute the percentage of respondents supporting this stance, the scale has been dichotomised: each value above the middle range value indicates support, and each value on or below the middle range value indicates a low score.

[c] Based on a five-point scale, recoded on a scale from 0 to 1.

[d] To compute the average score across countries, each national sample (except Luxembourg) was given an equal weight, irrespective of the sample size. In effect, all countries were given a standard sample size of 1750, and Luxembourg a standard sample size of 875.

[e] To compute the average score across countries, the countries were weighted according to their population size.

Table A4.6.2 Mean score and percentage support on 'resistance to diversity' and 'in favour of ethnic distance' per country

	Resistance to diversity		*Favour Ethnic distance*		
Country	*Mean* [a]	*% support* [b]	*Mean* [c]	*% support* [b]	*N*
Finland	.538	44.96	.291	18.43	1953
Sweden	.510	39.90	.185	9.06	1920
Denmark	.528	43.76	.263	17.35	1435
United Kingdom	.482	34.75	.296	18.86	1988
Ireland	.462	28.92	.298	19.37	1954
Netherlands	.472	30.80	.287	17.74	2311
Belgium	.525	41.98	.347	25.21	1789
Luxembourg	.495	33.03	.170	9.09	1068
West Germany	.512	39.56	.265	16.03	1709
East Germany	.528	42.10	.299	21.39	1086
Austria	.520	43.01	.194	11.42	2129
Spain	.555	47.87	.264	16.45	1606
Portugal	.664	68.29	.264	18.24	1434
Italy	.566	48.14	.359	27.75	1176
Greece	.721	77.23	.437	39.33	2401
Poland	.645	67.64	.291	19.50	2055
Czech Republic	.618	61.81	.387	30.99	1321
Hungary	.542	45.64	.315	22.18	1641
Slovenia	.613	59.34	.350	26.99	1493
All countries [d]	.554	47.69	.296	20.59	32469
All countries [e]	.547	46.47	.299	20.47	32469

[a] Based on a five-point scale, recoded on a scale from 0 to 1.

[b] To compute the percentage of respondents supporting this stance, the scale has been dichotomised: each value above the middle range value indicates a support, and each value on or below the middle range value indicates a low score.

[c] Based on a eleven-point scale, recoded on a scale from 0 to 1.

[d] To compute the average score across countries, each national sample (except Luxembourg) was given an equal weight, irrespective of the sample size. In effect, all countries were given a standard sample size of 1750, and Luxembourg a standard sample size of 875.

[e] To compute the average score across countries, the countries were weighted according to their population size.

Table A4.6.3 Mean score and percentage support on 'favour repatriation policies for criminal migrants' and 'perceived collective ethnic threat' per country

	Favour repatriation policies for criminal migrants		*Perceived collective ethnic threat*		
Country	*Mean* [a]	*% support* [b]	*Mean* [c]	*% support* [b]	*N*
Finland	.624	59.34	.495	41.83	1953
Sweden	.577	49.32	.452	32.81	1920
Denmark	.540	43.83	.518	49.97	1435
United Kingdom	.634	60.34	.570	61.19	1988
Ireland	.634	59.82	.539	54.36	1954
Netherlands	.662	65.47	.539	55.08	2311
Belgium	.656	63.44	.571	62.88	1789
Luxembourg	.558	46.28	.481	39.58	1068
West Germany	.715	75.19	.542	57.40	1709
East Germany	.770	83.88	.584	65.99	1086
Austria	.636	61.46	.525	52.03	2129
Spain	.663	64.62	.524	51.96	1606
Portugal	.753	83.21	.564	61.54	1434
Italy	.780	79.88	.530	53.94	1176
Greece	.834	87.27	.706	84.73	2401
Poland	.730	78.08	.548	57.48	2055
Czech Republic	.833	86.74	.615	75.13	1321
Hungary	.867	91.90	.618	74.65	1641
Slovenia	.676	69.59	.568	63.36	1493
All countries [d]	.695	69.54	.554	58.17	32469
All countries [e]	.710	72.18	.552	58.18	32469

[a] Based on a five-point scale, recoded on a scale from 0 to 1.

[b] To compute the percentage of respondents supporting this stance, the scale has been dichotomised: each value above the middle range value indicates a support, and each value on or below the middle range value indicates a low score.

[c] Based on a eleven-point scale, recoded on a scale from 0 to 1.

[d] To compute the average score across countries, each national sample (except Luxembourg) was given an equal weight, irrespective of the sample size. In effect, all countries were given a standard sample size of 1750, and Luxembourg a standard sample size of 875.

[e] To compute the average score across countries, the countries were weighted according to their population size.

Notes appendices

[1] We applied the goodness-of-fit measure GFI of Jöreskog and Sörbom (1993a). GFI is a normed statistics ranging from zero to one. As a rule-of-thumb, a minimum value for GFI of 0.90 has been proposed. Browne and Cudeck (Browne & Cudeck, 1992) proposed a fit measure that takes account of the error of approximation in the population. They suggested using Steiger's Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA) as a measure of the discrepancy (due to approximation) per degree of freedom. RMSEA will be zero only if the model fits exactly. It will decrease if parameters are added to the model that substantially reduce the discrepancy due to approximation. If, however, the additional parameters reduce the discrepancy only slightly, the RMSEA can increase. Based on practical experience, Browne and Cudeck suggested that a value of 0.05 or less indicates a close fit of the model in relation to the degrees of freedom, whereas values of 0.08 and lower indicate a reasonable error of approximation.

[2] As Bollen (1989, p. 356) pointed out, the comparability (or invariance) in models represents a continuum. He distinguished between two dimensions of comparability: model form and similarity in parameter values. Models for different samples have the same form if each model has the same parameter matrices with the same dimensions and the same location of fixed, free, and constrained parameters. The invariance in model form is a matter of degree. On the one hand, the invariance in model form can be rather low if models have very different numbers of latent variables or if observed variables load on different latent variables in different models. On the other hand, the invariance in model form is rather high if the model forms are identical except for the pattern of correlated measurement errors. Models can also differ with regard to the parameter values, from the one extreme where no parameters are equal across the populations under study, to the other extreme where all are invariant.

[3] Since only ratios of factor loadings are identified – and not factor loadings themselves – the model assumes invariance of factor loading ratios across countries. Invariance of all factor loadings across countries is not a testable assumption. However, if the assumption of invariant factor loading ratios is justified, then it is probably safe to assume invariance of the factor loadings themselves (Bielby, 1986).

[4] LISREL detected normality violations in the correlation matrix for the resistance against immigrants items. This was solved by dichotomising these items in the LISREL analyses ('allow none' and 'a few' in a category and 'allow some' and 'many' in a category).

[5] In some instances, the programme may provide a negative variance estimate for the measurement error of a particular item. This situation is called a Heywood case (Boomsma & Hoogland, 2001). This anomaly can be solved by setting the specific error variance to a fixed value, for instance zero. Since fixation of error variances to zero would imply absence of measurement error, we prefer to set negative error variances to a value of .05

[6] Based on the available information in the ESS dataset, the following variables were applied in the regression analysis of household income: 'years of fulltime education', 'age' (divided into six categories); 'social class of the respondent', 'marital status' (with categories (i) living with partner, (ii) married, but not living with partner (iii) divorced/separated (iv) widowed (v) not living with a partner, previously cohabited with a partner and (vi) never lived with a partner), 'having children', and 'subjective perception of household income'. A random normal deviate was added to this estimated income value to prevent a drop in the standard deviation of the income variable. Finally, the range of the imputed income values was set equal to the original range of the income variable.